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Relaxing the I.I.D. Assumption:
Adaptive Minimax Optimal Sequential Prediction with Expert Advice
Blair Bilodeau∗,1, Jeffrey Negrea∗,1, and Daniel M. Roy1
Abstract
We consider sequential prediction with expert advice when the data are generated stochasti-
cally, but the distributions generating the data may vary arbitrarily among some constraint set.
We quantify relaxations of the classical I.I.D. assumption in terms of possible constraint sets,
with I.I.D. at one extreme, and an adversarial mechanism at the other. The Hedge algorithm,
long known to be minimax optimal in the adversarial regime, has recently been shown to also
be minimax optimal in the I.I.D. setting. We show that Hedge is suboptimal between these
extremes, and present a new algorithm that is adaptively minimax optimal with respect to our
relaxations of the I.I.D. assumption, without knowledge of which setting prevails.
1 Introduction
In order to reason and make predictions about future events, statistical models often specify that
future data will behave exactly the same as past data; that is, they assume the data are indepen-
dently and identically distributed (I.I.D.), or more generally, generated from some transformation
of a stationary process. This reduces the problem to understanding the existing data available to
the researcher, which falls under the purview of classical statistical inference. However, can one
confidently say the data truly fits this model, or at least that such an assumption is benign? Even
if such an assumption fails, this does not mean that a model relying on the I.I.D. assumption is
unsuitable for the task of predicting future data, but it is of interest to be able to quantify its
suitability. An ideal statistical method should perform as well as possible relative to the degree to
which reality departs from the I.I.D. assumption, and do so without knowledge of the size of this
departure in advance.
To address the robustness to the I.I.D. assumption, we make predictions one at a time, so that
performance guarantees under relaxations of the I.I.D. assumption are possible. At each round, the
player (a.k.a. the data analyst) makes a (randomized) prediction, an observation is stochastically
generated from some round-specific distribution, and the player incurs some loss quantifying how
close their prediction was to the observation. The goal of the player is to minimize their loss.
However, due to the data-generating distributions being allowed to change over time, guarantees
on predictive performance for future rounds using only historical data may be impossible. Instead,
since without a simple data-generating distribution the concept of risk is not defined, we measure
performance using regret, which is the difference of the cumulative loss of the player and the best
cumulative loss among some class of benchmark predictors, referred to as experts.
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This setting has been extensively investigated in both the case where the data-generating distri-
bution is fixed but arbitrary (i.e., the I.I.D. setting), and where it may be chosen adversarially
to maximize the player’s regret. While these two situations may seem unrelated, Mourtada and
Gaïffas (2019) showed that minimax optimal regret can be achieved simultaneously by a simple
algorithm (Hedge, defined in Section 7), which resembles Bayesian inference for an expert-valued
parameter.
A natural question is whether Hedge can also perform optimally under various relaxations of the
I.I.D. assumptions that are less extreme than completely adversarial data. Many such relaxations
have been proposed (see Section 4 for a detailed review), but our relaxation differs from existing
work by: a) characterizing the divergence of the data-generating mechanism from the I.I.D. as-
sumption independently of the learning algorithm used, b) inducing a smoothly varying spectrum
on the difficulty of learning the data-generating mechanism, and c) being parametrized by nat-
ural extensions of the quantities appearing in the best possible a priori regret bounds from the
adversarial and stochastic cases.
We show in Theorem 3 that the stochastic-and-adversarially optimal tuning of Hedge does not
adapt to all levels of relaxation. In Corollary 1 and Theorem 3, we show that Hedge can achieve
minimax optimal performance only when its parameters are tuned using a priori knowledge of the
level of relaxation. Without such an oracle tuning, Hedge can only adapt suboptimally. To achieve
optimal performance, we present a novel algorithm (Meta-CARE, see Section 9), which is shown to be
minimax optimal by the combination of our upper bound, Theorem 4, and lower bounds, Theorem 2
and Proposition 1. Two other main contributions that enable these results are Theorem 1, which
is a concentration of measure inequality under a relaxation of the I.I.D. assumption, and a novel
algorithm and analysis based on follow-the-regularized-leader in Section 8.
2 Notation and Problem Setup
Let Yˆ be a prediction space, Y be a space of observations, and ℓ : Yˆ ×Y → [0, 1] be a loss function.
Suppose there areN ∈ N experts that are arbitrarily indexed by [N ] = {1, . . . , N}. Unless otherwise
specified (required only for lower bounds), suppose that these are arbitrary and fixed throughout
the remainder of the present manuscript. LetM(A) denotes the set of all probability measures on
an arbitrary space A. For every round t ∈ N, the expert predictions yˆ[N ](t) = (yˆi(t))i∈[N ] ∈ Yˆ [N ]
are sampled from some distribution µˆ[N ](t) ∈ M(Yˆ [N ]) chosen based on historical information.
Next, the player picks a prediction distribution, µˆ(t) ∈M(Yˆ), and the data-generating mechanism
selects a distribution for the next data point, µ(t) ∈ M(Y), both with knowledge of the expert
predictions and the history. Then, the observation, y(t) ∈ Y, and the player’s prediction, yˆ(t) ∈ Yˆ,
are sampled simultaneously from these distributions, and the player incurs a loss of ℓ(yˆ(t), y(t)).
We use the notion of a policy to describe the mechanism by which the player forms predictions
using only the information available to them at any round. As their actions at each round are
decided by probability measures they select based upon the information available, this decision
mechanism is naturally represented by a probability kernel. In particular, we view a player policy
πˆ as a sequence (one for each round) of probability kernels that map historical information and
the experts’ predictions to a predictive distribution. Similarly, the experts’ actions and the data-
generating distribution may be “chosen” using only historical information. To allow for potential
collusion between the experts and the environment, we encode these choices in a single sequence of
probability kernels π, which we refer to as the data-generating mechanism.
Formally, let K(A,B) denote the set of probability kernels (regular conditional distributions) from
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A to B. Define the space of single-round observations by H = Yˆ × Yˆ [N ] × Y, and for each round
t ∈ N, define the history preceding the round by h(t− 1) = (yˆ(s), yˆ[N ](s), y(s))s∈[t−1] ∈ Ht−1. Thus
player’s policy is πˆ = (πˆt)t∈N with πˆt ∈ K(Ht−1 × Yˆ [N ], Yˆ) for all t ∈ N, and the data-generating
mechanism is π = (πt)t∈N with πt ∈ K(Ht−1, Yˆ [N ]×Y) for all t ∈ N. That is, the experts’ predictions
and the data-generating distribution at round t depend on only each other and h(t− 1), while the
player’s distribution is chosen using both h(t− 1) and the current experts’ predictions.
The player’s performance at the end of T ∈ N rounds depends on solely h(T ) and is measured by
the regret, defined by
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
ℓ(yˆ(t), y(t)) − min
i∈[N ]
T∑
t=1
ℓ(yˆi(t), y(t)).
Since R(T ) only depends on h(T ) through the loss function, regret bounds are often characterized
using quantities that combine the data-generating distributions and the loss function. To do so,
we define ℓi(t) = ℓ(yˆi(t), y(t)) for each i ∈ [N ], ~ℓ(t) = (ℓi(t))i∈[N ]. Often, we are interested in the
cumulative losses, which we denote using Li(t) =
∑t
s=1 ℓi(s) and
~L(t) =
∑t
s=1
~ℓ(s). Further, for a
distribution µ ∈M(Yˆ [N ] × Y), we define the notation Eµℓi def= E(yˆ[N],y)∼µ[ℓ(yˆi, y)] for any i ∈ [N ].
Now, the I.I.D. setting can be viewed as selecting a single distribution µ◦ ∈ M(Yˆ [N ] × Y) and
supposing that the data-generating mechanism satisfies πt(h, ·) = µ◦ for all t ∈ N and h ∈ Ht−1. It
is well known that the minimax optimal expected regret under the I.I.D. assumption depends on
the stochastic gap. Letting I◦(µ◦) def= {i ∈ [N ] : Eµ◦ℓi = mini′∈[N ] ℓi′} be the set of experts that are
optimal (w.r.t. ℓ) in expectation under µ◦, the stochastic gap is ∆◦(µ◦)
def
= mini∈[N ]\I◦(µ◦) Eµ◦ [ℓi−ℓi◦ ]
for an arbitrary i◦ ∈ I◦. The minimax optimal expected regret under the I.I.D. setting with
|I◦(µ◦)| = 1 is known to be
ER(T ) ∈ Θ
(
logN
∆◦(µ◦)
)
.
We extend these parameters to a relaxation of the I.I.D. assumption. In particular, suppose there
is an unknown, convex D ⊆ M(Yˆ [N ] × Y), and any data-generating mechanism π = (πt)t∈N must
satisfy that for all t ∈ N and h ∈ Ht−1, πt(h, ·) ∈ D. Then, we define the set of effective experts as
I◦(D) =
{
i ∈ [N ]
∣∣∣ (∃µ ∈ D)[i ∈ argmin
i′∈[N ]
Eµℓi′
]}
.
These are the experts that have the ability to be the best (in expectation) on any particular round.
The size of the effective expert set will be denoted by
N◦(D) = |I◦(D)| .
Further, we introduce the notion of the effective stochastic gap, defined by
∆◦(D) = inf
µ∈D
{
min
i∈[N ]\I◦(D)
Eµ [ℓi − ℓi∗ ]
∣∣∣ i∗ ∈ argmin
i′∈[N ]
Eµℓi′
}
.
In particular, it is the minimal excess expected loss of an ineffective expert over the best effective
expert on any round. Note that this is a direct generalization of the standard stochastic gap from
the I.I.D. setting. When D is clear, we simplify notation to I◦, N◦, and ∆◦.
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3 Main Results
For any D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ] ×Y), let Π(D) denote the collection of policies π such that for all t ∈ N and
h ∈ Ht−1, πt(h, ·) ∈ D. Throughout this section, K denotes a universal constant, but varies from
one expression to the next. In Theorem 3 we show that Hedge with the learning rate required to
be minimax optimal in both the stochastic and adversarial settings is suboptimal and completely
non-adaptive in between; i.e there exist Yˆ, Y, ℓ, such that for large enough N◦, N , and T , there
exist a D and π ∈ Π(D) with |I◦(D)| = N◦ and
ER(T ) ≥ K√T logN.
In Corollary 1 (quantitative version Theorem 6), we show that if an alternative learning rate is
chosen, Hedge adapts to any convex D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ] ×Y) and T ∈ N, but it does so suboptimally. In
particular,
sup
π∈Π(D)
ER(T ) ≤ K
(
log(N◦)
√
T +
(logN)2
∆◦
)
.
We also show in Theorem 3 that there exist Yˆ, Y, and ℓ such that for any N◦ and large enough
N and T , there exist a D and π ∈ Π(D) with |I◦(D)| = N◦ such that Hedge with the alternative
tuning has
ER(T ) ≥ log(N◦)
√
T
4
.
We know that the adaptation of Hedge is suboptimal, having shown in Corollary 2 (quantitative
version Theorem 7) that our novel algorithm FTRL-CARE adapts with a better rate to any convex
D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ] × Y) and T ∈ N:
sup
π∈Π(D)
ER(T ) ≤ K
(√
T logN◦ +
(logN)3/2
∆◦
)
.
We conclude that this is the optimal dependence on N◦ and T from the matching lower bound
in Theorem 2. Finally, we show in Theorem 4 that our second novel algorithm, Meta-CARE, can
improve the power on logN from 3/2 to 1 for the special case of N◦ = 1, matching the dependence
on N and ∆◦ from the minimax lower bound in Proposition 1.
The terms involving ∆−1◦ may give the impression that the difficulty of a relaxation of the I.I.D.
assumption diverges as the best ineffective expert approaches the effective experts in expected loss
as the constraint set is expanded. However, this is not the case, because for any time T , the
adversarial bound of .
√
T logN always holds. This distinction is made explicit in the quantitative
versions of our results (Theorems 6 and 7). The proper interpretation of the terms involving ∆−1◦ is
that they upper bound the finite total amount of excess regret that will be incurred over an infinite
time horizon in order to differentiate which experts are effective and ineffective.
4 Related Work
Early results for sequential (online) data, such as sequential hypothesis testing (Wald, 1945) and
sequential experimental design (Robbins, 1952), focused on I.I.D. observations. However, much of
the work since then—particularly in the learning theory community—has focused on the develop-
ment and theory of algorithms for deterministic, adversarial data sequences. While the stochastic
results are very powerful, they lose their utility when the departure from the I.I.D. assumption is
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unquantified. Similarly, the adversarial assumption does not require this “trust” in the behaviour
of the data-generating mechanism, but it may be overly pessimistic if the data one encounters
happens to be well behaved.
4.1 Stochastic Constraints
In this paper, we pursue minimax optimal algorithms for prediction with expert advice in both
the stochastic and adversarial settings under the prequential forecasting framework introduced by
Dawid (1984). In particular, we use a decision-theoretic variant of the prequential framework,
where we place a probability distribution over an action space. This setting is not just useful in
many applications, but in fact contains essential ingredients for good minimax performance against
potentially adversarial data sequences. Specifically, one must update their prediction mechanism
sequentially in order to avoid performing arbitrarily poorly by failing to learn a change in the
data-generating mechanism that occurs after an initial training set is sampled. Further, for certain
notions of performance (including regret), the player must incorporate randomness into their fore-
casts in order to do well; see, for example, Section 4.1 of Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), or the
seminal work of Nash (1950; 1951) on minimax optimal mixed (probabilistic) policies for adversarial
games.
Due to the prevalence of the I.I.D. assumption in practical applications, there is a need to quantify
the benignity of making such an assumption even if it does not actually hold. We view this as
a quantitative version of the infamous statement “all models are wrong, some are useful” (Box,
1979). Further, there is a desire to absolve oneself from the burden of specifying such model
assumptions by making predictions using a learning algorithm that will perform minimax optimally
regardless of how far the data-generating distribution diverges from the I.I.D. assumption. We
define relaxations of the I.I.D. assumption via constraints on the data-generating mechanism, which
can be viewed as building on Rakhlin et al. (2011). Their main tool is a sequential analogue of
the symmetrization technique (see, for example, Section 2.3 of van der vaart and Wellner, 1996)
commonly used in obtaining minimax risk bounds. Our constraint setting diverges from Rakhlin
et al.’s by its characterization in terms of easily interpretable parameters, leading to a more intuitive
hierarchy. A key aspect of this interpretability is that, while we do not expect to ever actually
know the constraint set in practice, one should be able to identify the constraint parameters given
such a set. Our parameters are more readily computable than, say, the (sequential) Rademacher
complexity of an expert class.
In particular, following Rakhlin et al. (2011), we consider the minimax performance of a player
when the conditional distribution (w.r.t. the historical data) of the observed data is restricted to a
convex subset of the space of all probability measures over the next observation. One may view the
constraint set as a relaxation of I.I.D.-ness, where a singleton constraint corresponds to I.I.D. and
no constraint corresponds to adversarial. Then, we quantify the effect of this relaxation in terms of
how many experts can be considered “good” predictors, and the margin by which they are better
over “not-good” experts. These two parameters provide a direct and interpretable measure of how
far the data-generating mechanism is from I.I.D., up to and including completely adversarially
generated data.
Another line of work exists which aims to apply the techniques of classical statistical learning
theory (Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1971; 1974; Valiant, 1984) when the data generating process is
not assumed to be I.I.D. The original contributions in this direction are for the scenario where the
covariate distribution is not I.I.D. and there is a fixed but unknown labeling function to be learned.
Littlestone (1988) provided an algorithm and novel mistake bound for the online realizable case,
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while Ben-David et al. (2009) extended these results to the online agnostic case. Some more recent
advances in this direction include those of Hanneke (2017) and Dawid and Tewari (2020).
4.2 Notions of Easy Data
Outside of the stochastic constraint framework, significant progress has been made over the last
decade towards developing regret bounds that depend on various quantities specific to the observed
data sequence. While the terminology for these types of bounds varies in the literature, we will
follow the nomenclature of Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2007), who differentiate between zero-order, first-
order, and second-order regret bounds. In this work, we use stochastic constraints to link zero- and
second-order bounds in a general framework, allowing us to compare with results derived in a wide
range of settings.
Zero-order bounds refer to those which depend only on the time horizon, the size of the expert
class, and an absolute bound on the size of the predictions (alternatively, the losses). Results of
this nature have existed for many years, beginning with Littlestone and Warmuth (1994) and Vovk
(1998), and are concisely summarized by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006). These bounds are often
dubbed worst-case or adversarial, since they hold for any sequence of observations subject to the
aforementioned global constraints.
In contrast, first-order bounds control regret in terms of a data-dependent quantity; namely, the
sum of the actual observed losses (potentially over all experts, or just the best expert for tighter
results). Hence, they may lead to much tighter bounds than those which are zero-order if the actual
observed losses end up being in a much tighter range than is guaranteed by some absolute bound
on the size of the losses. The first bound of this form was by Freund and Schapire (1997) for the
weighted majority (Hedge) algorithm, which was later upgraded to a multiplicative rather than
additive dependence on the cumulative best loss (Corollary 2.4, Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006).
Similar bounds have been developed for the bandit setting (Auer et al., 2003; Audibert and Bubeck,
2010), algorithms with adaptive tuning (Hutter and Poland, 2004; van Erven et al., 2011), and the
combination of adaptive tuning with partial information (Neu, 2015).
However, a limitation of first-order bounds is that they are not translation-invariant in the losses.
In particular, they suggest that every expert incurring loss of one on each round is much harder
to compete against than every expert incurring loss of zero on each round, which is not the case.
One solution is to obtain regret bounds that are similar to first-order, but rather than depending
on the sum of the losses, they depend on a single first-order translation-invariant parameter that
characterizes the observed loss sequence. In the bandit setting, examples of such a parameter
include the effective loss range (Cesa-Bianchi and Shamir, 2018; Thune and Seldin, 2018) and the
amount of corruption allowed on the mean of the losses (equivalently, rewards) (Lykouris et al., 2018;
Gupta et al., 2019). A similar analysis of corruption of expert predictions in the full-information
setting has recently appeared by Amir et al. (2020).
Beyond these first-order quantities, another line of work has focused on second-order bounds, which
depend on some form of variation of the observed losses. The first results of this form were derived
by Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2007), who obtain a bound in terms of the sum of the squared losses via
tuning the learning rate for Hedge. This was extended by both McMahan and Streeter (2010) and
Hazan and Kale (2010) to depend on the sample second moment and variance respectively of the
losses (empirically along the trajectory of observations), and again by Hazan and Kale (2011) to
obtain the same in the bandit setting. Both van Erven et al. (2011) and de Rooij et al. (2014)
obtain similar variation bounds which are smaller for a different notion of “easy data” (defined by
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the mixability of the loss). Finally, another type of second-order bound was developed by Gaillard
et al. (2014), where they utilize the squared difference of algorithm losses with expert losses.
We in fact derive second-order (in particular, variance) bounds for the observed data sequence (see
the intermediary result Theorem 5). However, we are also able to extend this notion due to the
stochastic nature of our constraints. In particular, once we take the expectation (with respect to
the data-generating mechanism and the player’s actions) of our second-order bounds, we obtain
bounds directly comparable to (and tighter than) existing zero-order bounds. This provides greater
insight than existing second-order bounds, which often leave a direct dependence on the variability
of the chosen learning algorithm that is not a priori clear, and don’t explicitly characterize what
an “easy” data sequence actually looks like.
In the full-information setting, another line of investigation describes “easy” stochastic data by
that which satisfies a Bernstein condition; that is, the conditional second moment of the losses
are controlled by a concave function of the conditional first moment. This condition was shown
to be crucial for achieving fast-rates in the batch setting by Bartlett and Mendelson (2006), then
in the online convex optimization setting (infinite expert class) by van Erven and Koolen (2016),
and finally for simultaneously the finite expert and infinite expert online setting by Koolen et al.
(2016).
4.3 Stochastic and Adversarially Optimal Algorithms
In parallel to developing bounds for “easy” data, there has been a line of work towards developing
algorithms which are simultaneously optimal in two key settings: fully adversarial observations
(as in zero-order bounds) and I.I.D. (stochastic) observations. These bounds are characterized by
matching the adversarial bounds mentioned above and the optimal stochastic bounds for either
bandits (Theorem 1, Auer et al., 2002) or full-information (Theorem 11, Gaillard et al., 2014).
Beginning with Audibert and Bubeck (2009) and Bubeck and Slivkins (2012), the bandit literature
is rich in this area; contributions include removing prior knowledge of the time horizon (Seldin
and Slivkins, 2014), matching lower bounds (Auer and Chiang, 2016), and an optimal algorithm
for both the stochastic and adversarial settings with respect to a slightly weaker notion of regret
(Zimmert and Seldin, 2019).
In our discussion of the previous bounds, we have not specifically distinguished between the types
of algorithms used to achieve them. However, there is an aesthetic (and computational) desire to
find algorithms that achieve regret bounds that are optimal both for worst-case data and some
notion of “easy” data, and yet are as simple as the algorithms which perform well in either just
the adversarial or just the I.I.D. setting. A recent breakthrough on this front was achieved by
Mourtada and Gaïffas (2019), who showed the standard tuning of the Hedge algorithm is optimal
for both the adversarial and the stochastic settings. For the bandit setting, the 1
2
-Tsallis-INF
algorithm of Zimmert and Seldin (2019) has a similarly simple aesthetic. One of the more surprising
contributions of our work is that we show any pre-specified learning rate schedule for Hedge cannot
be adaptively optimal for all constraints simultaneously.
5 Concentration of Measure under I.I.D. Relaxation
For our results we will heavily use the following assumption.
Assumption 1. D is convex.
To reassure the reader about this assumption, we observe the following.
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Remark 1. If D was not natively convex, our results may still be applied to its convex hull. ⊳
Remark 2. Given a set D of joint distributions available for the data-generating mechanisms to
play, requiring the set to be convex is equivalent to also allowing mixtures of the original available
distributions. That is, the adversary and experts can use randomness to select which distribution
to play at each round. ⊳
Remark 3. For any i◦ ∈ [N ],
D(a.s.)i◦,∆
def
=
{
µ ∈M1(Yˆ [N ] × Y)
∣∣∣ ℓi◦ +∆ ≤ min
i∈[N ]\{i◦}
ℓi almost surely
}
is convex (since min is concave) and has I◦(D(a.s.)i◦,∆ ) = {i◦} and ∆◦(D
(a.s.)
i◦,∆ ) = ∆. Therefore the
adversarial-with-a-gap setting of Seldin and Slivkins (2014) satisfies this condition. ⊳
Remark 4. For any i◦ ∈ [N ],
Di◦,∆ def=
{
µ ∈M1(Yˆ [N ] × Y)
∣∣∣ Eµℓi◦ +∆ ≤ min
i∈[N ]\{i◦}
Eµℓi
}
is convex (since min is concave) and has I◦(Di◦,∆) = {i◦} and ∆◦(Di◦,∆) = ∆. Therefore the
adversarial-with-an-E-gap setting of Mourtada and Gaïffas (2019, Corollary 6) satisfies this condi-
tion. ⊳
Now, we are able to state a form of concentration of measure for constrained adversaries, the proof
of which appears in Appendix B. We will use this result repeatedly in the proofs of regret upper
bounds for Hedge, FTRL-CARE, and Meta-CARE.
Theorem 1 (Relaxed Hoeffding’s Inequality). For any player policy πˆ and any convex D, λ > 0,
T0 < T1, and i ∈ [N ] \ I◦,
sup
π∈Π(D)
E min
i◦∈I◦
exp

λ
T1∑
t=T0+1
[ℓi◦(t)− ℓi(t)]

 ≤ exp
{
(T1 − T0)
[
λ2/2− λ∆◦
]}
.
Since there may be a different best expert in expectation at each round, Azuma–Hoeffding would
yield a weaker bound. This result tells us that regardless of the fact that the best expert may vary
from round to round, the gap between the best effective expert along the observed data path and
any ineffective expert grows like a sum of uniformly sub-Gaussian random variable with mean below
−∆◦. The proof of this result is based on von Neumann’s minimax theorem, which illuminates the
need for convexity, as per Assumption 1.
6 Minimax Lower Bounds
In this work, we will present algorithms which achieve minimax optimal regret in relaxations of the
I.I.D. assumption. In order to show this, we must first understand the best possible performance
by any algorithm. In particular, we quantify the best any player policy (proper or improper) can
do with oracle knowledge of the number of effective experts. While we do not expect a player to
be able to know the nature of the constraint set, this bound will allow us to show that algorithms
that do not use this information, but perform as well as the best possible algorithm with oracle
knowledge, must minimax-optimally adapt. The proof of this result is found in Appendix H.1, and
we note that the constant of 100 in the lower bound is asymptotically replaced by 2 as N◦ and T
tend to infinity.
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Theorem 2. There exists a Yˆ, Y, and ℓ such that for all N ∈ N and N◦ ≤ N , there exists a
t0(N◦) ∈ N where for any T ≥ t0(N◦),
sup
D∈V(N,N◦)
sup
π∈Π(D)
inf
πˆ
ER(T )√
T log(N◦)/100
≥ 1,
where
V(N,N◦) =
{
D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ] × Y)
∣∣∣ |I◦(D)| = N◦, D is convex} .
The following result establishes a lower bound for when there is only one effective expert. To
state it, we require the notion of a proper learner. A proper learner is any player policy πˆ⋆ such
that for each t ∈ N, for any h(t − 1) ∈ Ht−1 and yˆ[N ](t) ∈ Yˆ [N ], there exists a µ(t) ∈ simp([N ])
with πˆ⋆t ((h(t − 1), yˆ[N ](t)), ·) = [yˆ[N ](t)]♯µ(t), where this push forward is defined by viewing the
vector yˆ[N ](t) as a function yˆ[N ](t) : [N ] → Yˆ . Additionally, the lower bound is in terms of the
pseudo-regret, defined by
R¯(T ) = E
[ T∑
t=1
ℓ(yˆ(t), y(t))
]
− min
i∈[N ]
E
[ T∑
t=1
ℓ(yˆi(t), y(t))
]
.
By Jensen’s inequality, R¯(T ) ≤ ER(T ), so lower bounding pseudo-regret is a stronger result.
Proposition 1 (Mourtada and Gaïffas (2019, Proposition 4)). For all N ∈ N, there exist Yˆ, Y,
and ℓ such that for all ∆ ∈ (0, 1/4) and all T ≥ logN16∆2 ,
inf
πˆ⋆
sup
D∈V∆(N,1)
sup
π∈Π(D)
256∆ R¯(T )
logN
≥ 1,
where
V∆(N,N◦) =
{
D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ] × Y) | |I◦(D)| = N◦, ∆◦(D) = ∆, D is convex
}
.
These two lower bounds set the bar for what one should hope to achieve. To be able to adapt to
an unknown number of effective experts N◦ ∈ [N ] as well as unknown indices of the best experts,
the player can be forced to incur O(max(√T logN◦, logN∆◦ )) regret. This tells tell us that “good
adaptive performance” is O(√T logN◦ + logN∆◦ ) (because the max has the same order as the sum).
7 Performance of Hedge
In this section, we show that the algorithm Hedge can adapt somewhat to the constraint parameters,
but it does not do so minimax optimally. Following this section, we will present our novel algorithm
FTRL-CARE, which does adapt minimax-optimally when there are multiple effective experts, and then
we will boost these two algorithms together in Meta-CARE to achieve minimax-optimal rates in all
settings. For all of these algorithms, we note that in fact the information available to the player
could have been restricted to just losses rather than the full history since they are all proper learners
(as defined in the previous section).
Hedge with learning rate (η(t))t∈N is the proper learner πˆ⋆ defined at each t ∈ N and for any history
h(t− 1) ∈ Ht−1, by the weights
wi(t) =
exp {−η(t)Li(t− 1)}∑
i′∈[N ] exp {−η(t)Li′(t− 1)}
,
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such that the kernels satisfy
πˆ⋆t ((h(t− 1), yˆ[N ](t)), ·) =
[
yˆ[N ](t)
]
♯
~w(t).
It is well-known (see, for example, Theorem 2.3 of Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) that there exists
a c such that Hedge with η(t) = c/
√
t is optimal in the adversarial case (when D =M(Yˆ [N ] ×Y)).
Recently, Mourtada and Gaïffas (2019) showed that Hedge with this same learning rate is also
optimal in the fully stochastic setting (when D = {µ}, a singleton set). One might hope that this
stochastic and adversarially optimal learning rate will also perform well for all convex D in between
these two cases. However, we now show that in fact the conventional learning rate will fail to adapt
to the number of effective experts when N◦ 6∈ {1, N}. Further, we show that a different learning
rate can adapt in some ways, but does not result in the optimal dependence (i.e., dependence
achieved with oracle knowledge of D) on T . This will motivate our development of a new algorithm
in Section 8 that does achieve the minimax optimal dependence on T for all sizes of the set of
effective experts.
7.1 Upper Bounds for Hedge
We provide a bound on the regret of Hedge with explicit constants in Theorem 6, but we state here
the bound with only higher order terms as a corollary.
Corollary 1 (Bounding the regret of Hedge). There is a universal constant K > 0 such that for
all c > 0, playing Hedge with η(t) = c√
t
satisfies that for any convex D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ]×Y) and T ∈ N,
sup
π∈Π(D)
ER(T ) ≤ K
[(
c · I[N◦≥2] +
logN◦
c
)√
T +
(logN)2
∆◦c2
+ c
]
.
In order to more easily interpret this result, we also state it for various reasonable choices of c.
Remark 5. In the setting of Corollary 1, there exists a universal constant K > 0 such that:
i) if c is chosen independently of N (i.e., c ∝ 1),
sup
π∈Π(D)
ER(T ) ≤ K
[
log(N◦)
√
T +
(logN)2
∆◦
]
;
ii) if c is chosen to depend on N with c ∝ √logN ,
sup
π∈Π(D)
ER(T ) ≤ K
[
I[N◦>1]
√
T logN +
logN
∆◦
]
;
iii) if the player also has oracle knowledge of N◦ > 1 used to choose c with c ∝
√
logN◦,
sup
π∈Π(D)
ER(T ) ≤ K
[√
T logN◦ +
(logN)2
∆◦ logN◦
]
.
⊳
Together with the minimax lower bounds of Section 6, we find that for the stochastic and adversarial
settings our regret bound for Hedge with learning rate η(t) =
√
log(N)/t is tight and that the
algorithm achieves the optimal rates, as noted by Mourtada and Gaïffas (2019). Furthermore, we
have improved upon Mourtada and Gaïffas (2019, Corollary 6) in the “adversarial-with-an-E-gap”
setting (which is equivalent to our constrained setting when N◦ = 1), having removed the extra
log(1/∆◦)
∆◦ dependence which separated the upper and lower bounds in their work.
10
7.2 Algorithm Specific Lower Bounds for Hedge
Next, we observe that playing Hedge with the learning rate that is optimal for both the stochastic
and adversarial cases cannot adapt to an intermediary number of effective experts. Additionally,
playing Hedge with a learning rate that does not vary with the number of experts can do better
than the stochastic and adversarial optimal learning rate, but still cannot do as well as the oracle
knowledge dependence on T given in Theorem 2. We prove this result in Appendix H.2.
Theorem 3. The upper bounds on the regret for Hedge in Corollary 1 have matching lower bounds.
(i) For all N ≥ 13 and N◦ ≤ min
(
exp
(
c2 logN
72 exp{c2/4} − c
2
8
)
− 1, N
)
there exists a Yˆ, Y, and ℓ such
that for any c > 0, T ≥ 16 logNc2 , Hedge with η(t) = c
√
logN√
t
satisfies
sup
D∈V(N,N◦)
sup
π∈Π(D)
ER(T )√
T logN
≥ c
exp{c2/4} .
(ii) For all N ≥ 13 and N◦ ∈
[
exp{c2/4 + 4 log(3)}, N ], there exists a Yˆ, Y, and ℓ, such that for
any c > 0, T ≥ 32 logN
c2
, Hedge with η(t) = c√
t
satisfies
sup
D∈V(N,N◦)
sup
π∈Π(D)
ER(T )
log(N◦)
√
T
≥ 1/4.
Remark 6. We in fact prove a stronger version of Theorem 3 that holds almost surely for a
slightly weaker notion of regret. However, this expectation result suffices for concluding Hedge is
not minimax optimal. ⊳
8 Beating Hedge Without Oracle Knowledge
In Section 7, we completed the story of Hedge by showing that the learning rate of η(t) = 1/
√
t can
adapt the dependence on T to the number of effective experts. However, since this requires a slower
learning rate that doesn’t include logN , it does not match the known optimal rate of
√
T logN
in the full adversarial setting. One might even suspect that we can improve the expected regret
upper bound rate of log(N◦)
√
T to
√
T logN◦, since the latter rate can be achieved if the player
has oracle knowledge of N◦ for tuning the learning rate.
In this section, we present a modified algorithm which does exactly this. Taking inspiration from the
fact that Hedge can be viewed as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) using entropic regularization
(see, for example, Section 3.6 of McMahan, 2017), we introduce the constraint-adaptive root-entropy
(CARE) regularizer. In particular, we are able to prove upper bounds for the performance of FTRL
for a large class of regularizers, and then use these upper bounds to prove the results of Section 7
and upper bounds for FTRL-CARE by viewing them as FTRL with specifically chosen regularizers.
Our bound shows that FTRL-CARE achieves the oracle rate
√
T logN◦ without requiring knowledge
of the parameters characterizing the constraint set D.
8.1 FTRL Algorithm
An online linear optimization problem in Rd is defined by a closed prediction domain F ⊆ Rd, a
loss domain G ⊆ Rd, and an adversary πolo. At each time t, the player selects a point ~µ(t) ∈ F
and incurs loss defined by the inner product of their selection with some ~λ(t) ∈ G chosen by πolo.
In particular, for the filtration F (t) = σ
(
~µ(1), ~λ(1), . . . , ~µ(t− 1), ~λ(t − 1)
)
, the player selects ~µ(t)
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using a F (t)-measurable policy. Then, for losses ~λ(1 : T ) chosen by πolo, a player’s regret is defined
by
Rolo(T ) =
T∑
t=1
〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t)
〉
− inf
~µ∈F
T∑
t=1
〈
~λ(t), ~µ
〉
.
By convention an empty sum is taken to be 0; so that
∑0
t=1
~λ(t) = 0. When we restrict consideration
to proper policies (see Section 6) for the player, this generalizes the online prediction problem of
Section 2, which is just the case where F = simp([N ]) and G = [0, 1][N ], and we are interested in
ERolo(T ).
There are many ways one could choose ~µ(t), but in this work we focus specifically on FTRL, which
is a generic method for online linear optimization. The FTRL algorithm is parametrized by F , G,
and a sequence of regularizers {ρt : F → R}t∈Z+ . For each time t+ 1, a player using the FTRL(F ,
G, {ρt}t∈Z+) algorithm will select
~µ(t+ 1) = argmin
~µ∈F
(〈
~Λ(t), ~µ
〉
+ ρ0:t(~µ)
)
, (1)
where ρ0:t(~µ) =
∑t
s=0 ρs(~µ) and
~Λ(t) =
∑t
s=1
~λ(s).
8.2 The Constraint-Adaptive Root Entropy Regularizer
Now, to bound the expected regret, we are interested in the online linear optimization setting
where F = simp([N ])
def
= {~µ ∈ R[N ]+ |
∑
i∈[N ] ~µi = 1} and G = [0, 1][N ]. The first observation to
make about FTRL in this setting is that it directly generalizes Hedge. In particular, it is well known
that for r0:t(~µ) = −
√
t+1
c H(~µ), the solutions played by FTRL(simp([N ]), [0, 1]
[N ], {rt}t∈Z+) are
equivalent to the weights played by Hedge with η(t) = c√
t
, where we are using the entropy function
H(~µ) = −∑i∈[N ] µi log(µi). Now, we will modify this entropic-regularizer to achieve improved
performance for the constrained cases strictly between stochastic and adversarial data.
In order to motivate this new algorithm, we point out the following key facts. First, from Remark 5,
playing Hedge with η(t) =
√
log(N◦)/t achieves the oracle rate. Second, the worst-case constrained
adversary will force ~µ to concentrate to Unif(I◦). Finally, for ~µ = Unif(I◦), H(~µ) = log(N◦).
These three observations together suggest that playing Hedge with the learning of the form η(t) =√
H(~µ(t))/t may lead to oracle regret. However, ~µ(t) is defined in terms of η(t), so this is an
implicit system of equations to be solved at each time t. In order to define our modification of
FTRL, we choose a regularizer such that the solution to the FTRL optimization problem gives rise to
a similar system of equations to the one just defined. In particular, for parameters c1, c2 > 0, the
sequence of regularizers we use is defined by
r0:t(~µ) = −
√
t+ 1
c1
√
H(~µ) + c2 . (2)
We call this the constraint-adaptive root-entropy (CARE) regularizer. Consequently, follow-the-
regularized-leader with constraint-adaptive root-entropy regularization (or, FTRL-CARE) is just the
algorithm FTRL(simp([N ]), [0, 1][N ], {rt}t∈Z+), where rt is induced by Eq. (2).
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will use ~u for solutions to FTRL(simp([N ]), [0, 1][N ],
{rt}t∈Z+) with a generic regularizer, ~w for solutions via entropic regularization (Hedge), and ~̟ for
weights generated via root-entropic regularization (FTRL-CARE). For an efficient implementation of
FTRL-CARE, see Appendix I.
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8.3 Performance of FTRL-CARE
Similarly to the case for Hedge, we provide a bound on the regret of FTRL-CARE with explicit
constants in Theorem 7, but we state here the bound with only higher order terms as a corollary.
Corollary 2 (Bounding the regret of FTRL-CARE). There is a universal constant K > 0, such that
for any convex D ⊆ M(Yˆ [N ] × Y) and T ∈ N, playing FTRL-CARE with parameters c1 = c2 = 1
incurs
ER(T ) ≤ K
[√
T logN◦ +
(logN)3/2
∆◦
]
.
Remark 7. Note that in the case N◦ = 1, this is worse than Hedge with learning rate η(t) =
√
logN
t ,
which has regret proportional to logN∆◦ . ⊳
9 CARE if you can, Hedge if you must, or Meta-CARE for all
Since we have seen in Corollary 1 that Hedge with learning rate η(t) =
√
log(N)/t achieves the
optimal order of logN when N◦ = 1, and Corollary 2 shows that FTRL-CARE is optimal in all other
cases, it is natural to try to combine these two learners in order to have optimal regret for all values
of I◦ and ∆◦. To achieve this, we introduce the Meta-CARE algorithm.
Intuitively, Meta-CARE plays both Hedge and FTRL-CARE, treats these as two new meta-experts,
and then outputs the weighted average of these meta-experts with respect to a new weight vector,
where the new weight vector is specifically the output of Hedge played on these meta-experts.
Consequently, the Meta-CARE algorithm has four parameters: cHedge, cCARE,1, cCARE,2, cMeta > 0. For
each t ∈ N, let ~w(t) denote the weight vector produced by Hedge with learning rate η(t) = cHedge√
t
at
time t and let ~̟ denote the weight produced by FTRL-CARE with parameters cCARE,1, cCARE,2 at time
t. Consider the meta-losses defined by
ℓHedge(t) =
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
, ℓCARE(t) =
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉
,
LHedge(t) =
t∑
s=1
ℓHedge(t), LCARE(t) =
t∑
s=1
ℓCARE(t).
Then, for each t ∈ N, Meta-CARE with parameters cHedge, cCARE,1, cCARE,2, cMeta > 0 produces the
weight vector
~ш(t+ 1)
def
=
~w(t+ 1) exp
{− ηMeta(t)LHedge(t)} + ~̟ (t+ 1) exp {− ηMeta(t)LCARE(t)}
exp
{− ηMeta(t)LHedge(t)}+ exp {− ηMeta(t)LCARE(t)} ,
where ηMeta(t) =
cMeta√
t
. Observe that ~ш(t + 1) will be an element of simp([N ]) since it is a convex
combination of ~w(t+ 1) and ~̟ (t+ 1), both of which are elements of simp([N ]).
Theorem 4. There is a universal constant K > 0 such that for any convex D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ]×Y) and
T ∈ N, playing Meta-CARE with parameters cHedge =
√
logN and cCARE,1 = cCARE,2 = cMeta = 1 incurs
ER(T ) ≤ K
[√
T logN◦ + I[N◦=1]
logN
∆◦
+ I[N◦≥2]
(logN)3/2
∆◦
]
.
The proof of this result appears in Appendix G.
13
Remark 8. The parameters of Meta-CARE can be tuned to optimize the N◦ = 1 bound of Theorem 6
and the leading term of Theorem 7, hence improving K, but it does not affect the order of the
bound. The bound-optimizing parameters are specifically cHedge =
(
128
9
)1/4√
logN , cCARE,1 =
√
2/3,
cCARE,2 = 1 and cMeta =
√
8 log 2. ⊳
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A Additional Technical Details
A.1 Expectation Operator
To state and prove the full versions of our results, we require slightly more care in the notation for
expectations. The following formally clarifies how a player policy and data-generating mechanism
are interleaved together to define the probability space under which all expectations in this paper
are taken.
First, given a D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ]×Y), for each t ∈ N define the allowable kernels for the data-generating
mechanism to use by the set
Πt(D) =
{
πt ∈ K(Ht−1, Yˆ [N ] × Y)
∣∣∣ (∀h ∈ Ht−1)[πt(h, ·) ∈ D]} .
Similarly, the allowable kernels for the player policy to use are defined by
Πˆt = K(Ht−1 × Yˆ [N ], Yˆ).
For t0 < t1 ∈ N, we can then define
Πt0:t1(D) =
t1∏
t=t0
Πt(D) and Πˆt0:t1 =
t1∏
t=t0
Πˆt.
Observe that then we have
Π(D) =
∏
t∈N
Πt(D) and Πˆ =
∏
t∈N
Πˆt.
Let ∅ denote the empty tuple and recall h(0) = ∅. For π1:t ∈ Π1:t(Dℓ) and πˆ1:t ∈ Πˆ1:t, let Pπ1:t,πˆ1:t
denote the joint probability measure of
(
yˆ[N ](s), yˆ(s), y(s)
)
s∈[t] given by recursively interleaving the
kernels in π1:t, πˆ1:t together. Formally, when t = 1 this is defined for a measurable A1 ⊆ H by
Pπ1:1,πˆ1:1(A1) =
∫ [∫
I[(yˆ[N](1),y(1),yˆ(1))∈A1]πˆ1
(
(∅, yˆ[N ](1)),dyˆ(1)
)]
π1
(
∅,d(yˆ[N ](1), y(1))
)
.
Similarly, when t ≥ 2 this is defined recursively for a measurable At ⊆ Ht by
Pπ1:t,πˆ1:t (At) =
∫ [∫ (∫
I[(h(t−1),(yˆ[N](t),y(t),yˆ(t)))∈At]πˆt
(
(h(t− 1), yˆ[N ](t)),dyˆ(t)
))
×πt
(
h(t− 1),d(yˆ[N ](t), y(t))
)]
Pπ1:t−1,πˆ1:t−1(dh(t− 1)).
Let Eπ1:t,πˆ1:t denote expectation under Pπ1:t,πˆ1:t . By the Kolmogorov extension theorem, there is a
unique infinite product measure with finite dimensional marginals given by (Pπ1:t,πˆ1:t)t∈N, which we
denote by Pπ,πˆ, and under which expectation is denoted by Eπ,πˆ.
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A.2 Definition of Quasi-regret
We can in fact generalize the notion of Rolo from Subsection 8.1 to strategies which are not proper.
In particular, for a player policy πˆ and data-generating mechanism π, we define the random element
quasi-regret at time T by
Rˆπˆ(T ) =
T∑
t=1
∫
ℓ(yˆ(t), y(t))πˆt
(
(h(t− 1), yˆ[N ](t)),dyˆ(t)
)
− min
i∈[N ]
T∑
t=1
ℓ(yˆi(t), y(t)).
Observe that this only differs from regret by considering the expectation of the player’s loss, but
still allows the data-generating mechanism to react to the actual historical player actions. Further,
it is clear that Eπ,πˆ Rˆπˆ(T ) = Eπ,πˆR(T ). However, we can often prove almost sure results about
Rˆπˆ′(T ) for some player policy πˆ
′, and then state expectation results of the form Eπ,πˆRˆπˆ′(T ), where
the expectation is with respect to a different player policy πˆ. These results are crucial for our use
of boosting to obtain regret bounds for Meta-CARE.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 relies heavily on a version of von Neumann’s minimax theorem, which we restate for
completeness here.
Proposition 2 (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), Theorem 7.1). Let X and Y be convex subsets
of linear topological spaces, and suppose that X is compact. Let f : X × Y → R be such that:
(i) for all y ∈ Y, f(·, y) : X → R is convex and continuous, and
(ii) for all x ∈ X , f(x, ·) : Y → R is concave.
Then,
inf
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
f(x, y) = sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
f(x, y).
Proof of Theorem 1. Let simp(I◦) =
{
~v ∈ RI◦+ :
∑
i◦∈I◦ vi◦ = 1
}
. First, since at least one optimal
solution to a linear program on a compact convex polytope must be found at a vertex,
min
i◦∈I◦
T1∑
t=T0+1
[
ℓi◦(t)− ℓi(t)
]
= inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
T1∑
t=T0+1
[ 〈
~v, ~ℓI◦(t)
〉
− ℓi(t)
]
.
Further, since e is a monotone function, this implies that
min
i◦∈I◦
e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[
ℓi◦ (t)−ℓi(t)
]
= inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉−ℓi(t)].
Then, applying Jensen’s and the max-min inequality gives
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉−ℓi(t)]
≤ sup
π∈Π(D)
inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
Eπ,πˆ e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦ (t)〉−ℓi(t)]
≤ inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦ (t)〉−ℓi(t)].
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Now, note that Eπ,πˆ exp
{
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉 − ℓi(t)]} only depends on π ∈ Π(D) through the
first T1 kernels, and on πˆ ∈ Πˆ through the first T1 − 1 kernels. Thus, for any ~v ∈ simp(I◦),
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉−ℓi(t)] = sup
π1:T1∈Π1:T1 (D)
Eπ1:T1 ,πˆ1:T1
e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉−ℓi(t)].
By the tower rule for conditional expectation and the definition of the kernel πT1 ,
sup
π1:T1∈Π1:T1 (D)
Eπ1:T1 ,πˆ1:T1
e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉−ℓi(t)]
= sup
π1:T1∈Π1:T1 (D)
Eπ1:T1 ,πˆ1:T1[
e
λ
∑T1−1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦ (t)〉−ℓi(t)] ∫ eλ[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(T1)〉−ℓi(T1)] πT1(h(T1 − 1), d(yˆ[N ](T1), y(T1)))
]
≤ sup
π1:T1−1∈Π1:T1−1(D)
Eπ1:T1−1,πˆ1:T1−1
[
e
λ
∑T1−1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉−ℓi(t)]( sup
µ∈D
Eµ e
λ[〈~v, ~ℓI◦〉−ℓi])]
=
(
sup
π1:T1−1∈Π1:T1−1(D)
Eπ1:T1−1,πˆ1:T1−1
[
e
λ
∑T1−1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉−ℓi(t)]])( sup
µ∈D
Eµ e
λ[〈~v, ~ℓI◦〉−ℓi]
)
.
Iterating this argument T1 − T0 − 1 more times gives
inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉−ℓi(t)] ≤ inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
[
sup
µ∈D
Eµ e
λ[〈~v, ~ℓI◦〉−ℓi]
]T1−T0
=
[
inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
sup
µ∈D
Eµ e
λ[〈~v, ~ℓI◦〉−ℓi]
]T1−T0
.
Noting that simp(I◦) is convex, that D is convex (by Assumption 1), and that the objective
function f(~v, µ) = Eµe
λ[〈~v, ~ℓI◦〉−ℓi] is continuous and convex in ~v and linear (and hence concave)
in µ, Proposition 2 gives
inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
sup
µ∈D
f(~v, µ) = sup
µ∈D
inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
f(~v, µ).
Thus,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦(t)〉−ℓi(t)] ≤
[
sup
µ∈D
inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
Eµ e
λ[〈~v, ~ℓI◦〉−ℓi]
]T1−T0
.
Consider any µ ∈ D, and let i∗(µ) ∈ argmini∈[N ] Eµℓi. By the definition of ∆◦, Eµ
[
ℓi∗(µ) − ℓi
]
≤
−∆◦ for any i ∈ [N ] \ I◦. Finally, since ~ℓ ∈ [0, 1]N µ-a.s., by Hoeffding’s inequality we get
inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
Eµ e
λ[〈~v, ~ℓI◦〉−ℓi] ≤ Eµ eλ[ℓi∗(µ)−ℓi] ≤ eλ2/2−λ∆◦ .
Since this holds for all µ ∈ D,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ inf
~v∈simp(I◦)
e
λ
∑T1
t=T0+1
[〈~v, ~ℓI◦ (t)〉−ℓi(t)] ≤ [eλ2/2−λ∆◦]T1−T0 = e(T1−T0)[λ2/2−λ∆◦].
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C Quantitative Upper Bounds for Hedge and FTRL-CARE
In this section, we set up the tools needed to prove our upper bounds on the regret of Hedge and
FTRL-CARE, and then state and prove the quantitative versions of Corollaries 1 and 2. To do so,
we will rely on the technical details developed in Appendix D (which are applied to the simplex
in Appendix E) by considering FTRL(simp([N ]), [0, 1][N ], {rt}t∈Z+) with the Hedge and FTRL-CARE
regularizers respectively. We now state the necessary conclusions from those sections.
Definition 1. For any strictly increasing, concave, and twice continuously differentiable function
ψ : [0, logN ]→ R and strictly increasing β : N→ R+, we simplify notation for FTRL on the simplex
with transformed entropic regularization by using FTRLH(ψ, β) to denote FTRL(simp([N ]), [0, 1]
[N ],
{rt}t∈Z+) with r0 = −ψ ◦H and r0:t = β(t)r0.
Theorem 5. The solutions from an arbitrary FTRLH(ψ, β) are equivalent to the weights played by
Hedge with an implicitly defined learning rate. In particular, they are defined by the solution to the
system of equations
ηˆ(t+ 1) =
1
β(t) · ψ′ ◦H(~u(t+ 1)) , ~u(t+ 1) =
(
exp (−ηˆ(t+ 1)Li(t))∑
i′∈[N ] exp (−ηˆ(t+ 1)Li′(t))
)
i∈[N ]
.
Moreover, for any sequence of losses {~ℓ(t)}t∈N ⊆ [0, 1][N ], this system has a unique solution satis-
fying
ηˆ(t+ 1) ∈
[
1
β(t) · ψ′(0) ,
1
β(t) · ψ′(logN)
]
,
and there exists a sequence {αt}t∈N ⊆ [0, 1] such that the quasi-regret of this policy satisfies
RˆFTRLH (T ) ≤ −β(T )ψ(0) +
T∑
t=0
[β(t) − β(t− 1)] · [ψ ◦H](~u(t+ 1))
+
T∑
t=1
√
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(
β(t)
β(t−1) − 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
× Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
β(t) · [ψ′ ◦H](~v(t+ 1)) ,
(3)
where ~v(t+ 1) = argmin
~v∈simp([N ])
(〈
αt~L(t) + (1− αt) β(t)β(t−1) ~L(t− 1), ~v
〉
− β(t)[ψ ◦H](~v)
)
.
Proof of Theorem 5. This is an immediate consequence of the combination of Corollary 4 and Lem-
mas 4, 6 and 7, as well as the observation that ~u∗(T ) = argmin~u∈simp([N ])
〈
~L(T ), ~u
〉
will occur at
a vertex of the simplex, so H(~u∗(T )) = 0.
Ultimately, we wish to apply Theorem 5 to both Hedge and FTRL-CARE. Recall that Hedge with
learning rate η(t) = c√
t
corresponds to
ψ(s) =
s
c
, ψ′(s) =
1
c
, and β(t) =
√
t+ 1 ,
while FTRL-CARE with parameters c1, c2 > 0 corresponds to
ψ(s) =
√
s+ c2
c1
, ψ′(s) =
1
2c1
√
s+ c2
, and β(t) =
√
t+ 1 .
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Both correspond to using β(t) =
√
t+ 1 with some ψ, so we focus on this rather than continuing to
use a generic β(t). We leave ψ as generic for the moment, since the following result equally applies
to the algorithms’ respective ψ functions. Finally, we wish to move towards proving bounds on the
expected regret, which will require taking expectation with respect to a data-generating mechanism
π, so we fix a convex D which will generate the adversary’s allowable policies.
In order to control the bound of Theorem 5, we need to control the entropy of the FTRLH weights
~u as well as the intermediate weights ~v (defined immediately after Eq. (3)). We obtain such an
entropy bound using the following observation, which we prove in Appendix F.1.
Lemma 1. For any ~u ∈ simp([N ]) and p ∈ (0, 1), the entropy is bounded by
H(~u) ≤ 2
e log 2
logN◦ +
(
1 +
1
(1− p)e
) ∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
[ui]
p.
This result motivates the next lemma, which bounds the worst-case moments of the FTRLH and
intermediate weights for ineffective experts. Observe that the bound on the weights will hold
regardless of the actual policy used by the player, as discussed in Appendix A.2. The proof of
the following lemma appears in Appendix F.2, and hinges upon Theorem 1 for concentration of
measure.
Lemma 2. For any convex D ⊆ M(Yˆ [N ] × Y), if ~u are the solutions to FTRLH(ψ,
√
t+ 1), then
for any t ∈ N, p > 0, and i ∈ [N ] \ I◦,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ
[
[ui(t+ 1)]
p
]
≤ exp
{
p2
2(ψ′(0))2
− ∆◦p√
2(ψ′(0))
√
t
}
. (4)
Moreover, if for each t ∈ N and α ∈ [0, 1] we define
~v(α)(t+ 1) = argmin
~v∈simp([N ])
(〈
α~L(t) + (1− α)
√
t+ 1
t
~L(t− 1), ~v
〉
−√t+ 1[ψ ◦H](~v)
)
,
then for each p > 0 and i ∈ [N ] \ I◦ it holds that
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ sup
α∈[0,1]
[
[v
(α)
i (t+ 1)]
p
]
≤ exp
{
2p
ψ′(0)
+
p2
2(ψ′(0))2
− ∆◦p√
2(ψ′(0))
√
t
}
. (5)
We now apply Lemma 2 to Lemma 1 specifically for p = 1/2 to bound the entropy of both the
FTRLH weights ~u and the intermediate weights ~v. In particular, for all t ∈ N,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆH(~u(t+ 1)) ≤ 17 logN◦
16
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
1
8(ψ′(0))2 − ∆◦
√
t
2
√
2(ψ′(0))
}
4
, (6)
and
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ sup
α∈[0,1]
H(~v(α)(t+ 1)) ≤ 17 logN◦
16
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
1
ψ′(0) +
1
8(ψ′(0))2 − ∆◦
√
t
2
√
2(ψ′(0))
}
4
.
(7)
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These bounds can now be used for the regularizers specific to Hedge and FTRL-CARE. Our policy
will be to break up the sum of Eq. (3) into the first t0 rounds and then the remaining rounds for
some carefully chosen t0. Note that t0 is not a parameter of the algorithm, but rather an artefact
of our proof. The rounds after t0 will be handled using our entropy bounds above, but the early
rounds we control with the following worst-case bound. The proof of the following result appears
in Appendix F.3. Note that it recovers the correct order of standard adversarial bounds for Hedge.
Lemma 3. For any t0 ∈ N and sequence of losses {~ℓ(t)}t∈N ⊆ [0, 1][N ], the weights played by
FTRLH(ψ,
√
t+ 1) satisfy
RˆFTRLH (t0) ≤
(
ψ(logN)− ψ(0) + 3
4ψ′(logN)
)√
t0 + 1 .
C.1 Statement and Proof of Quantitative Version of Corollary 1
For the quantitative version of Corollary 1, we actually are able to state a slightly stronger result.
In particular, the bounds on the expected quasi-regret of the Hedge weights hold even if the player
chooses yˆ using a different policy. This holds because a) the bound on the quasi-regret for FTRLH
holds almost surely and b) the expectation over the quasi-regret relies on Theorem 1, which does
not rely on the structure of FTRLH . This stronger result will become crucial when boosting Hedge
and FTRL-CARE together in Meta-CARE.
Theorem 6 (Quantitative version of Corollary 1). For any player policy πˆ, convex D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ]×
Y), and T ∈ N, for all c > 0, the quasi-regret of Hedge with η(t) = c√
t
satisfies
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T ) ≤
√
T + 1
[
log(N)
c
+
3c
4
]
.
Moreover, when T >
⌈
8(log(N)+c2/4+c)2
c2∆2◦
⌉
,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T ) ≤


√
T
[
17 log(N◦)
16c +
3c
4
]
+ 2
√
2
[
[log(N)]2
c2∆◦
+ log(N)c∆◦
]
if N◦ > 1
+ log(N)+7/c
2√
2∆◦
+
√
2 log(N)
c +
3c
4
2
√
2
[
[log(N)]2
c2∆◦
+ log(N)c∆◦ +
log(N)
∆◦
]
+ 3c
2/4+3c+7/c2+9
∆◦ if N◦ = 1.
+
√
2
[
log(N)
c +
3c
4
]
Proof of Theorem 6. Plugging in that Hedge with parameter c > 0 corresponds to ψ(s) = s/c,
Theorem 5 says that the weights ~w lead to quasi-regret bounded by
RˆHedge(T ) ≤
T∑
t=0
√
t+ 1−√t
c
H(~w(t+ 1))
+
T∑
t=1
c
√
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
√
t+ 1
,
(8)
where
~v(t+ 1) = argmin
~v∈simp([N ])
(〈
αt~L(t) + (1− αt)
√
t+ 1√
t
~L(t− 1), ~v
〉
−
√
t+ 1
c
H(~v)
)
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for some αt ∈ [0, 1]. Then, recalling that ψ′(s) = 1/c, we can split up Eq. (8) into the rounds before
some t0 ∈ N and the rounds after by applying Lemma 3. That is, when T ≤ t0, we use the bound
of Lemma 3, and if T > t0 we have
RˆHedge(T ) ≤
√
t0 + 1
(
log(N)
c
+
3c
4
)
+
T∑
t=t0+1
√
t+ 1−√t
c
H(~w(t+ 1))
+
T∑
t=t0+1
c
√
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
√
t+ 1
.
(9)
Next, plugging ψ and ψ′ for Hedge into Eq. (6), we get
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆH(~w(t+ 1)) ≤ 17
16
log(N◦) +
7
4
(N −N◦) exp
{
c2
8
}
exp
{
− c∆◦
2
√
2
√
t
}
. (10)
Thus,
T∑
t=t0+1
√
t+ 1−√t
c
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆH(~w(t+ 1))
≤
17 log(N◦)
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
16c
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
c2
8
}
8c
T∑
t=t0+1
exp
{
− c∆◦
2
√
2
√
t
}
√
t
≤
17 log(N◦)
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
16c
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
c2
8 − c∆◦2√2
√
t0
}
√
2 c2∆◦
,
(11)
where the last step comes from applying Lemma 10 to bound the summation. For the last term of
Eq. (9), we consider the cases of N◦ > 1 and N◦ = 1 separately. If N◦ > 1, we use the same bound
as Lemma 3 of
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
≤ 9
16
and Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)] ≤ 1
4
.
Then,
T∑
t=t0+1
c√
t+ 1
√√√√ Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
≤ 3c
8
T∑
t=t0+1
1√
t+ 1
≤ 3c
4
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
.
(12)
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Combining Eqs. (9), (11) and (12) gives that
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T )
≤ √t0 + 1
(
log(N)
c
+
3c
4
)
+
17 log(N◦)
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
16c
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
c2
8 − c∆◦2√2
√
t0
}
√
2 c2∆◦
+
3c
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
4
=
√
T + 1
(
3c
4
+
17 log(N◦)
16c
)
+
√
t0 + 1
(
log(N)
c
− 17 log(N◦)
16c
)
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
c2
8 − c∆◦2√2
√
t0
}
√
2 c2∆◦
.
(13)
If I◦ = {i◦}, we control the variance terms using Lemma 8. In particular,
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
≤ 1
4
I[vi◦(t+1)≤1/2] + vi◦(t+ 1)(1 − vi◦(t+ 1))I[vi◦(t+1)>1/2]
≤ 1
4
I[vi◦(t+1)≤1/2] + (1− vi◦(t+ 1)).
(14)
Similarly, since
(√
t+1
t − 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t) ∈
[
−1, 12
]
,
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
≤
(
3
2
)2 (1
4
I[vi◦ (t+1)≤1/2] + (1− vi◦(t+ 1))
)
.
(15)
Thus, using Markov’s inequality, for any π ∈ Π(D) we have
Eπ,πˆ
√√√√ Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
≤ Eπ,πˆ
[
3
2
[
1
4
I[vi◦ (t+1)≤1/2] + (1− vi◦(t+ 1))
] ]
≤ 3
2
(
1
4
Pπ,πˆ [vi◦(t+ 1) ≤ 1/2] + Eπ,πˆ [1− vi◦(t+ 1)]
)
≤ 9
4
Eπ,πˆ [1− vi◦(t+ 1)]
=
9
4
Eπ,πˆ
[ ∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
vi(t+ 1)
]
.
Finally, we control this using Lemma 2 with p = 1, which gives
Eπ,πˆ

 ∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
vi(t+ 1)

 ≤ (N −N◦) exp
{
2c+
c2
2
}
exp
{
−∆◦c√
2
√
t
}
.
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Thus,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ
T∑
t=t0+1
c
√
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
√
t+ 1
≤ 9c
4
(N −N◦) exp
{
2c+
c2
2
}
T∑
t=t0+1
1√
t
exp
{
−∆◦c√
2
√
t
}
≤ 9√
2∆◦
(N −N◦) exp
{
2c+
c2
2
}
exp
{
−∆◦c√
2
√
t0
}
,
(16)
where the last step follows from again applying Lemma 10. Combing Eqs. (9), (11) and (16) gives
that when N◦ = 1,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T )
≤ √t0 + 1
(
log(N)
c
+
3c
4
)
+
17 log(N◦)
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
16c
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
c2
8 − c∆◦2√2
√
t0
}
√
2 c2∆◦
+
9(N −N◦) exp
{
2c+ c
2
2 − c∆◦√2
√
t0
}
√
2∆◦
.
(17)
Now, consider t0 =
⌈
8(log(N)+c2/4+c)2
c2∆2◦
⌉
. For the case where N◦ > 1, we plug this into Eq. (13) to
obtain
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T ) ≤
√
T + 1
(
3c
4
+
17
16c
log(N◦)
)
+
√
8(log(N) + c2/4 + c)2
c2∆2◦
+ 2
(
log(N)− log(N◦)
c
)
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
c2
8 − c∆◦2√2
√
8(log(N)+c2/4+c)2
c2∆2◦
}
√
2 c2∆◦
≤
√
T
(
3c
4
+
17
16c
log(N◦)
)
+
√
2 log(N)
c
+
3c
4
+
2
√
2 [log(N)]2
c2∆◦
+
log(N)√
2∆◦
+
2
√
2 log(N)
c∆◦
+
7√
2 c2∆◦
.
(18)
Similarly, for the case where N◦ = 1 (so log(N◦) = 0), we plug t0 into Eq. (17) to obtain
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sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T ) ≤
√
8(log(N) + c2/4 + c)2
c2∆2◦
+ 2
(
log(N)
c
+
3c
4
)
+
7exp
{
c2
8 − c∆◦2√2
√
8(log(N)+c2/4+c)2
c2∆2◦
}
√
2 c2∆◦
(N −N◦)
+
9(N −N◦) exp
{
2c+ c
2
2 − ∆◦c√2
√
8(log(N)+c2/4+c)2
c2∆2◦
}
√
2∆◦
≤ 2
√
2[log(N)]2
c2∆◦
+
2
√
2 log(N)
c∆◦
+
4 log(N)√
2∆◦
+
7/c2 + 9 + 3c2/4 + 3c√
2∆◦
+
√
2
( log(N)
c
+
3c
4
)
.
(19)
C.2 Statement and Proof of Quantitative Version of Corollary 2
Theorem 7 (Quantitative Version of Corollary 2). For any player policy πˆ, convex D ⊆M(Yˆ [N ]×
Y), and T ∈ N, for all c1, c2 > 0, the quasi-regret of FTRL-CARE with these parameters satisfies
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T ) ≤
√
(T + 1)[log(N) + c2]
(
1
c1
+
3c1
2
)
.
Moreover, when T ≥
⌈
2[log(N)+3c1
√
c2+
5
4
c21c2]
2
c21c2∆
2◦
⌉
,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T ) ≤


(
1
c1
+ 3c12
)[
33
32
√
(T + 1)[log(N◦) + c2] +
√
2 [log(N)+C]3/2
c1
√
c2∆◦ if N◦ > 1
+
√
2[log(N) + c2]
]
+
√
2(8+12c21)
3c21
√
c2∆◦(
1
c1
+ 3c12
)[√
2 [log(N)+C]3/2
c1
√
c2∆◦
+
√
2[log(N) + c2]
]
if N◦ = 1,
+ 1√c2∆◦
[
8
√
2
3c21
+ 6(1 +
√
c2)
]
where C = max{c2, 3c1√c2 + 54c21c2}.
Proof of Theorem 7. The argument in this section follows the same logical flow as Appendix C.1.
Plugging in that FTRL-CARE with parameters c1, c2 > 0 corresponds to ψ(s) =
√
s+c2
c1
, Theorem 5
says that the weights ~̟ lead to quasi-regret bounded by
RˆCARE(T ) ≤ −
√
(T + 1)c2
c1
+
T∑
t=0
√
t+ 1−√t
c1
·
√
H( ~̟ (t+ 1)) + c2
+
T∑
t=0
2c1
√
H(~v(t+ 1)) + c2√
t+ 1
×
√√√√ Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)],
(20)
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where
~v(t+ 1) = argmin
~v∈simp([N ])
(〈
αt~L(t) + (1− αt)
√
t+ 1√
t
~L(t− 1), ~v
〉
−
√
t+ 1
c1
√
H(~v) + c2
)
for some αt ∈ [0, 1]. Then, recalling that ψ′(s) = 12c1√s+c2 , we can split up Eq. (20) into the rounds
before some t0 ∈ N and the rounds after by applying Lemma 3. That is, when T ≤ t0, we use the
bound of Lemma 3, and if T > t0 we have
RˆCARE(T ) ≤
√
(t0 + 1)[log(N) + c2]
( 1
c1
+
3c1
2
)
−
√
(T + 1)c2
c1
+
T∑
t=t0
√
t+ 1−√t
c1
·
√
H( ~̟ (t+ 1)) + c2
+
T∑
t=t0+1
2c1
√
H(~v(t+ 1)) + c2√
t+ 1
×
√√√√ Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)].
(21)
Next, plugging ψ and ψ′ for FTRL-CARE into Eq. (6), using Jensen’s inequality with the concavity
of square root, and the fact that
√
x+ y ≤ √x+√y for all x, y > 0 gives
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ
√
H( ~̟ (t+ 1)) + c2
≤
√
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆH( ~̟ (t+ 1)) + c2
≤
√√√√√17 log(N◦)
16
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
c21c2
2 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
√
t√
2
}
4
+ c2
≤
√
17 log(N◦)
16
+ c2 +
4
√
(N −N◦) exp
{
c21c2
4 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
√
t
2
√
2
}
3
.
(22)
Similarly, we use these same properties and Eq. (7) to obtain
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ
√
H(~v(t+ 1)) + c2
≤
√
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆH(~v(t+ 1)) + c2
≤
√√√√√17 log(N◦)
16
+
7(N −N◦) exp
{
2c1
√
c2 +
c21c2
2 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
√
t√
2
}
+ c2
4
≤
√
17 log(N◦)
16
+ c2 +
4
√
(N −N◦) exp
{
c1
√
c2 +
c21c2
4 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
√
t
2
√
2
}
3
.
(23)
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Thus,
T∑
t=t0+1
√
t+ 1−√t
c1
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ
√
H( ~̟ (t+ 1)) + c2
≤
√
17
16 log(N◦) + c2
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
c1
+
T∑
t=t0+1
4
√
(N −N◦) exp
{
c21c2
4 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
2
√
2
√
t
}
3c1
√
t
≤
√
17
16 log(N◦) + c2
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
c1
+
8
√
2
√
(N −N◦) exp
{
c21c2
4 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
2
√
2
√
t0
}
3c21
√
c2∆◦
,
(24)
where the last step used Lemma 10. For the last term of Eq. (21), we consider the cases of N◦ > 1
and N◦ = 1 separately. If N◦ > 1, we again use the same bound as Lemma 3 of
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
≤ 9
16
and Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)] ≤ 1
4
.
Then, using Eq. (23) and another application of Lemma 10,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ
T∑
t=t0+1
2c1
√
H(~v(t+ 1)) + c2√
t+ 1
×
√√√√ Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
≤ 3c1
4
T∑
t=t0+1
√
17
16 log(N◦) + c2
t+ 1
+ c1
√
(N −N◦)
T∑
t=t0+1
exp
{
c1
√
c2 +
c21c2
4 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
√
t
2
√
2
}
√
t
≤
3c1
√
17
16 log(N◦) + c2
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
2
+
8
√
(N −N◦) exp
{
c1
√
c2 +
c21c2
4 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
√
t0
2
√
2
}
√
2c2∆◦
.
(25)
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Combining Eqs. (21), (24) and (25) gives that
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T )
≤
√
(t0 + 1)[log(N) + c2]
( 1
c1
+
3c1
2
)
−
√
(T + 1)c2
c1
+
√
17
16 log(N◦) + c2
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
c1
+
3c1
√
17
16 log(N◦) + c2
[√
T + 1−√t0 + 1
]
2
+
16
√
(N −N◦) exp
{
c21c2
4 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
√
t0
2
√
2
}
3
√
2c21
√
c2∆◦
+
8
√
(N −N◦) exp
{
c1
√
c2 +
c21c2
4 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
√
t0
2
√
2
}
√
2c2∆◦
≤ 33
32
√
(T + 1)[log(N◦) + c2]
( 1
c1
+
3c1
2
)
+
√
(t0 + 1)
( 1
c1
+
3c1
2
)(√
log(N) + c2 −
√
log(N◦) + c2
)
+
√
2
√
(N −N◦) exp
{
c21c2
4 −
c1
√
c2∆◦
2
√
2
√
t0
}
√
c2∆◦
( 8
3c21
+ 4exp {c1√c2}
)
.
(26)
When I◦ = {i◦}, we control the variance terms using Lemma 8 in exactly the same way as Ap-
pendix C.1. In particular, using Eqs. (14) and (15) shows that
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
· Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
≤ 9
4
[
1
16
I[vi◦ (t+1)≤1/2] + (1− vi◦(t+ 1))2I[vi◦ (t+1)>1/2]
]
≤ 9
4
[
1
16
I[vi◦ (t+1)≤1/2] + (1− vi◦(t+ 1))
]
.
Now, for any π ∈ Π(D), using Markov’s inequality we obtain
Eπ,πˆ
[
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
· Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
]
≤ 9
4
(
1
16
Pπ [vi◦(t+ 1) ≤ 1/2] + Eπ,πˆ [1− vi◦(t+ 1)]
)
≤ 81
32
Eπ,πˆ [1− vi◦(t+ 1)] =
81
32
Eπ,πˆ

 ∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
vi(t+ 1)

 .
Finally, we control this using Lemma 2 with p = 1, which gives
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ

 ∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
vi(t+ 1)

 ≤ (N −N◦) exp{4c1√c2 + 2c21c2 −√2 c1√c2∆◦√t}.
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Thus, using Cauchy-Schwarz and Eq. (23) (recalling log(N◦) = 0), for any π ∈ Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ
√√√√(H(~v(t+ 1)) + c2) Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
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√
Eπ,πˆH(~v(t+ 1)) + c2 ·
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Var
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[(√
t+ 1√
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
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I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)]
]
≤
9
√
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{
2c1
√
c2 + c
2
1c2 − c1
√
c2∆◦
√
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2
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√
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2
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√
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2
√
2
√
t
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√
2
+
9
√
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{
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√
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√
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{
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√
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√
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t
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.
Summing this and applying Lemma 10 gives
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆ
T∑
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2c1
√
H(~v(t+ 1)) + c2√
t+ 1
×
√√√√ Var
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(27)
Combining Eqs. (21), (24) and (27) gives that for N◦ = 1,
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T ) ≤
√
(t0 + 1)[log(N) + c2]
( 1
c1
+
3c1
2
)
−
√
(T + 1)c2
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+
8
√
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√
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]
+
6(1 +
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≤
√
(t0 + 1)[log(N) + c2]
( 1
c1
+
3c1
2
)
+
8
√
2(N −N◦) exp
{
c21c2
4 −
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√
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2
√
2
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3c21
√
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2
√
t0
}
.
(28)
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Now, suppose t0 =
⌈
2[log(N)+3c1
√
c2+
5
4
c21c2]
2
c21c2∆
2◦
⌉
, and set C = max{c2, 3c1√c2 + 54c21c2}. Then, when
N◦ > 1, we plug this into Eq. (26) to obtain
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T )
≤
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+
3c1
2
)[33
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√
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√
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√
2[log(N) + c2]
]
+
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√
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.
Similarly, when N◦ = 1, we plug t0 into Eq. (28) to obtain
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T )
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+ 2
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+
8
√
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√
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e
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4
− c1
√
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2
√
2
√
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√
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5
4
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2
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√
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e
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4
− c1
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)[√2 [log(N) + C]3/2
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√
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+
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+
1√
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8
√
2
3c21
+ 6(1 +
√
c2)
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.
D Generic FTRL Regret Bound with Local Norms
The standard regret bound for FTRL consists of a term which is the difference of losses incurred
by consecutive player vectors and a term which looks like the regularizer evaluated at the optimal
player vector in hindsight. The former is then usually bounded by an application of Holder’s
inequality to obtain a norm of the consecutive weight differences. For tighter control, such as by
Abernethy and Rakhlin (2009), this norm may be chosen to be a local norm. A local norm with
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respect to a function f will be of the form ‖x‖y =
√〈x, ∇2f(y)x〉, and has the nice property
that the dual is ‖x‖y,⋆ =
√〈x, (∇2f(y))−1x〉. The natural choice of function to define the local
norm with respect to is the regularizer; however, this is generally more challenging for non-constant
regularizers.
We begin with a modification of McMahan and Streeter (2010, Lemma 1) to combine local norm
bounds with time-dependent regularizer bounds.
Lemma 4. For any F , G, (ρs)s∈Z+ , and admissible adversarial policy πolo, the FTRL(F , G,
{ρt}t∈Z+) algorithm has regret bounded by
Rolo(T ) ≤ ρ0:T (~µ∗(T ))−
T∑
t=0
ρt(~µ(t+ 1)) +
T∑
t=1
〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)
〉
,
where ~µ∗(t) = argmin~µ∈F
〈
~Λ(t), ~µ
〉
.
Proof of Lemma 4. This follows from directly modifying the proof of McMahan and Streeter (2010,
Lemma 1) by not dropping the ρt(~µ(t + 1)) term at the end of McMahan and Streeter (2010,
Lemma 7). We reproduce the argument here for completeness.
As shown by Kalai and Vempala (2005), and restated in McMahan and Streeter (2010, Lemma 6),
T∑
t=0
ft(x⋆(t)) ≤
T∑
t=0
ft(x⋆(T ))
for any sequence of functions (ft)t∈Z+ where x⋆(t) = argminx
∑t
s=0 fs(x). Thus, by definition of
~µ(t+ 1) minimizing Eq. (1),
T∑
t=0
[〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t+ 1)
〉
+ ρt(~µ(t+ 1))
]
≤
T∑
t=0
[〈
~λ(t), ~µ(T + 1)
〉
+ ρt(~µ(T + 1))
]
≤
T∑
t=0
[〈
~λ(t), ~µ∗(T )
〉
+ ρt(~µ∗(T ))
]
=
〈
~Λ(T ), ~µ∗(T )
〉
+ ρ0:T (~µ∗(T )).
Rearranging gives that
Rolo(T ) =
T∑
t=0
〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t)
〉
−
〈
~Λ(T ), ~µ∗(T )
〉
=
T∑
t=0
〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)
〉
+
T∑
t=0
〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t+ 1)
〉
−
〈
~Λ(T ), ~µ∗(T )
〉
≤
T∑
t=0
〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)
〉
+ ρ0:T (~µ∗(T ))−
T∑
t=0
ρt(~µ(t+ 1)).
Finally, the indexing of t in the sums of the lemma statement follows since by convention ~λ(0) =
0.
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Now, we provide a local-norm control on the inner product from Lemma 4 for time-dependent
regularizers which can be defined as a function of time and a constant regularizer. The types of
regularizers we will consider are convex functions of the Legendre type, as defined by Rockafellar
(1970, Sec. 26).
Definition 2 (Essentially smooth, (Rockafellar, 1970, Sec. 26)). An extended-real-valued function
f : F → R for F ⊆ Rd is essentially smooth on F if it satisfies
1. interior(F ) 6= ∅,
2. f is differentiable on interior(F ), and
3. x ∈ ∂(F ) and {yi}i∈N ⊆ interior(F ) with yi → x implies ‖∇f(yi)‖ → +∞.
Definition 3 (Legendre type, (Rockafellar, 1970, Sec. 26)). A closed convex function f : F → R
for F ⊆ Rd is of the Legendre type on F if
1. f is strictly convex on interior(F ),
2. interior(F ) is convex, and
3. f is essentially smooth on F .
Definition 4 (Legendre Transform, (Rockafellar, 1970, Sec. 26)). The Legendre transform of a
function f : F → R for F ⊆ Rd of the Legendre type on F is the function f∗ : ∇f(interior(F ))→ R
defined by
f∗(y) = sup
x∈F
[〈x, y〉 − f(x)] =
〈
[∇f ]−1(y), y
〉
− f([∇f ]−1(y)).
Proposition 3 ((Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 26.5)). If f is a closed convex function of the Legendre
type on F for F ⊆ Rd and F ∗ = ∇f(interior(F )), then F ∗ is convex and f∗ is of the Legendre type
on F ∗,
∇f : interior(F )→ F ⋆
is a continuous bijection with continuous inverse, and ∇[f∗] = [∇f ]−1.
Corollary 3. If F ⊆ Rd is convex with non-empty interior, and if f is a closed, convex function
of the Legendre type on F , then for any y with −y ∈ ∇f(interior(F )),
argmin
x∈F
(〈y, x〉+ f(x)) =
{
[∇f ]−1(−y)
}
= {[∇[f∗]](−y)} ∈ interior(F ).
Proof. Since the objective is convex then if a single local minimum occurs in the interior F then
it must be the unique optimizer on F . Taking the gradient of the objective, we see that a local
minimum occurs when ∇f(x) = −y. Since f is assumed to be of the Legendre type on F then this
equation has a unique solution in interior(F ) whenever −y ∈ ∇f(interior(F )).
Lemma 5. Suppose that F ⊆ Rd is convex with non-empty interior, G ⊆ Rd is arbitrary, and the
regularizer ρ0 is closed, convex, of the Legendre type on F , and twice continuously differentiable
on interior(F ). For each t ∈ N, let ρ0:t(~µ) = β(t)ρ0(~µ) for some increasing function β : N → R+.
Also, for any ~x ∈ G and ~y ∈ F , define the time-dependent local norm by ‖~x‖2t,~y =
〈
~x, ∇2ρ0:t(~y)~x
〉
,
and its dual time-dependent local norm by ‖~x‖2t,~y,⋆ =
〈
~x, [∇2ρ0:t(~y)]−1~x
〉
. Then, for any sequence
of losses {~λ(t)}t∈N ⊆ G such that (− 1β(t)~Λ(t)) ∈ [∇ρ0](interior(F )) for all t ∈ N, there exists a
sequence {αt}t∈N ⊆ [0, 1] such that, for all t ∈ N, the solutions ~µ from the FTRL(F , G, {ρt}t∈Z+)
algorithm satisfy
〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)
〉
≤ 1
β(t)
∥∥∥∥
(
β(t)
β(t− 1) − 1
)
~Λ(t− 1)− ~λ(t)
∥∥∥∥
0,~v(t+1),⋆
∥∥∥~λ(t)∥∥∥
0,~v(t+1),⋆
,
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where ~v(t+ 1) = argmin~v∈F
(〈
αt~Λ(t) + (1− αt) β(t)β(t−1)~Λ(t− 1), ~v
〉
+ ρ0:t(~v)
)
.
Remark 9. In our applications, [∇ρ0](interior(F )) = Rd is the whole space, so the assumption
(− 1β(t)~Λ(t)) ∈ [∇ρ0](interior(F ))
will be benign. ⊳
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix some t ∈ N and observe that by Corollary 3, ~µ(t+ 1) is the unique ~µ that
solves ∇ρ0:t(~µ) = −~Λ(t). Thus, applying a first-order Taylor expansion of [∇ρ0:t]−1 centered at
∇ρ0:t(~µ(t)),
~µ(t+ 1)− ~µ(t) = [∇ρ0:t]−1(∇ρ0:t(~µ(t+ 1)))− [∇ρ0:t]−1(∇ρ0:t(~µ(t)))
= [J [∇ρ0:t]−1](−ζ(t)) [∇ρ0:t(~µ(t+ 1))−∇ρ0:t(~µ(t))] ,
where J denotes the Jacobian and −ζ(t) = αt∇ρ0:t(~µ(t+1))+(1−αt)∇ρ0:t(~µ(t)) for some αt ∈ [0, 1].
Using the inverse function theorem on ∇ρ0:t gives
[J [∇ρ0:t]−1](−ζ(t)) = [∇2ρ0:t([∇ρ0:t]−1(−ζ(t)))]−1.
Next, observe that
∇ρ0:t(~µ(t)) = β(t)∇ρ0(~µ(t)) = β(t)
β(t− 1)∇ρ0:t−1(~µ(t)) =
β(t)
β(t− 1)(−
~Λ(t− 1)),
so ζ(t) can be viewed as a combination of losses defined by
ζ(t) = αt~Λ(t) + (1− αt) β(t)
β(t− 1)
~Λ(t− 1).
Therefore, − ζ(t)β(t) = αt−
~Λ(t)
β(t) + (1 − αt)−
~Λ(t−1)
β(t−1) ∈ ∇ρ0(interior(F )) since ∇ρ0(interior(F )) is convex
(by Proposition 3). This implies
−ζ(t) ∈ [β(t)∇ρ0](interior(F )) = ∇ρ0:t(interior(F )),
so ~v(t+ 1) = [∇ρ0:t]−1(−ζ(t)) ∈ interior(F ) by Corollary 3. Further,
∇ρ0:t(~µ(t+ 1))−∇ρ0:t(~µ(t)) = −~Λ(t) + β(t)
β(t− 1)
~Λ(t− 1) =
(
β(t)
β(t− 1) − 1
)
~Λ(t− 1)− ~λ(t).
Combining these results, along with the fact that ∇2ρ0:t = β(t)∇2ρ0, gives
~µ(t+ 1)− ~µ(t) = 1
β(t)
[∇2ρ0(~v(t+ 1))]−1
[(
β(t)
β(t− 1) − 1
)
~Λ(t− 1)− ~λ(t)
]
. (29)
Next, by Holder’s inequality,〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)
〉
≤ ‖~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)‖t,~v(t+1)
∥∥∥~λ(t)∥∥∥
t,~v(t+1),⋆
= ‖~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)‖0,~v(t+1)
∥∥∥~λ(t)∥∥∥
0,~v(t+1),⋆
,
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where the last equality follows from the fact that a β(t) will factor out of the first norm and a
1/β(t) will factor out of the second norm. Then, plugging in Eq. (29),
‖~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)‖20,~v(t+1)
=
〈
∇2ρ0(~v(t+ 1)) [~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)], ~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)
〉
=
1
β(t)2
〈
[∇2ρ0(~v(t+ 1))]−1
[(
β(t)
β(t−1) − 1
)
~Λ(t− 1)− ~λ(t)
]
,
(
β(t)
β(t−1) − 1
)
~Λ(t− 1)− ~λ(t)
〉
=
1
β(t)2
∥∥∥∥
(
β(t)
β(t− 1) − 1
)
~Λ(t− 1)− ~λ(t)
∥∥∥∥
2
0,~v(t+1),⋆
.
Thus,
〈
~λ(t), ~µ(t)− ~µ(t+ 1)
〉
≤ 1
β(t)
∥∥∥∥
(
β(t)
β(t− 1) − 1
)
~Λ(t− 1)− ~λ(t)
∥∥∥∥
0,~v(t+1),⋆
∥∥∥~λ(t)∥∥∥
0,~v(t+1),⋆
.
Surprisingly, the closest such result in the literature that combines local norms and time-dependent
regularization seems to be McMahan (2017, Theorem 1), which requires that the regularizers are
strongly convex with respect to a norm and then defines the local norm using the time-dependent
strong convexity parameter. Amir et al. (2020) recently made the same observation, and prove a
regret bound very similar to Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. However, they rely on a Taylor expansion of
the regularizer around the weights output by FTRL, while we have used a Taylor expansion in the
dual space around the observed losses. This makes it easier for us to ultimately apply Theorem 1
when controlling the bound of Lemma 5 in expectation. Further, after combining with the convex
analysis facts listed above, using intermediate losses rather than intermediate weights allows us to
view the intermediate weights ~v prescribed by Lemma 5 as the output of another instance of FTRL.
E FTRL Regret Bounds on the Simplex
A significant portion of the heavy-lifting required for Theorem 5 is done in Appendix D, which
proves a very similar result for generic FTRL under some technical constraints. However, we cannot
directly apply Lemma 5 when F = simp([N ]), since this set has empty interior. Thus, we need
a version of that result tailored to the simplex, which we achieve by a reparametrization of the
simplex.
In particular, let i1 ∈ [N ] be arbitrary, and let ˆ[N ] = [N ] \ {i1}. Let
Fˆ =

~µ ∈ [R+]
ˆ[N ] s.t.
∑
i∈ ˆ[N ]
µi ≤ 1

 ,
and observe that interior(Fˆ ) is non-empty and convex. The canonical bijection φ : simp([N ])→ Fˆ
is given by
φ(~u) = ~u−i1 , and φ
−1(~µ) =
({
µi : i ∈ ˆ[N ]
1− 〈1, ~µ〉 : i = i1
)
i∈[N ]
where ~x−i is the vector obtained from x by dropping the coordinate with index i.
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For any function f : simp([N ])→ Y for some set Y, define fˆ : Fˆ → Y by
fˆ(~µ) = f(φ−1(~µ)).
For example, if we let H : simp([N ])→ R+ be the entropy function defined by
H(~u) = −
∑
i∈[N ]
ui log (ui) ,
then Hˆ : Fˆ → R is defined by
Hˆ(~µ) = H(φ−1(~µ)) = −

∑
i∈ ˆ[N ]
µi log (µi)

− (1− 〈1, ~µ〉) log (1− 〈1, ~µ〉) .
Note that for any sequence of regularizers {rt}t∈Z+ on simp([N ]) and any sequence of losses {~ℓ(t)}t∈N
in an arbitrary G ⊆ R[N ], for all t ∈ N we have〈
~L(t), ~u
〉
+ r0:t(~u) =
〈
~L−i1(t), ~u−i1
〉
+ Li1(t)(1 − 〈1, ~u−i1〉) + rˆ0:t(~u−i1)
= Li1(t) +
〈
~L−i1(t)− Li1(t)1, ~u−i1
〉
+ rˆ0:t(~u−i1).
Additionally, consider that for any sequence of losses {~ℓ(t)}t∈N ⊆ G and sequence {b(t)}t∈N ⊆ R,
argmin
~u∈simp([N ])
(〈
~L(t), ~u
〉
+ r0:t(~u)
)
= argmin
~u∈simp([N ])
(〈
~L(t)− b(t)1, ~u
〉
+ r0:t(~u)
)
by the requirement that ~u ∈ simp([N ]). Similarly, for any sequence {~u(t)}t∈N with ~u(t) ∈ simp([N ])
for each t ∈ N, the regret is unchanged by shifting the loss vectors. That is,
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~u(t)
〉
− inf
~u∈simp([N ])
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~u
〉
=
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t)− b(t)1, ~u(t)
〉
− inf
~u∈simp([N ])
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t)− b(t), ~u
〉
.
Thus, there are equivalence classes of solutions from the FTRL(simp([N ]), G, {rt}t∈Z+) algorithm
modulo parallel additive shifts of the loss vectors. Further, by transforming the losses via
Φ(~ℓ) = ~ℓ−i1 − ℓi11 and Φ+(~λ) =
({
λi : i ∈ ˆ[N ]
0 : i = i1
)
i∈[N ]
and defining Gˆ = {Φ(~ℓ) : ~ℓ ∈ G}, there is a canonical correspondence between the equivalence
classes of solutions from the FTRL(simp([N ]), G, {rt}t∈Z+) algorithm and of solutions from the
FTRL(Fˆ , Gˆ, {rˆt}t∈Z+) algorithm. Namely,
argmin
~u∈simp([N ])
(〈
~L(t), ~u
〉
+ r0:t(~u)
)
= φ−1
(
argmin
~µ∈Fˆ
(〈
Φ(~L(t)), ~µ
〉
+ rˆ0:t(~µ)
))
,
and under this correspondence Rˆπˆ(T ) = Rolo(T ).
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Corollary 4. Consider a regularizer r0 : simp([N ]) → R for which rˆ0 is closed, convex, of the
Legendre type on Fˆ (see Definition 3), and twice continuously differentiable on interior(Fˆ ). For each
t ∈ N, define r0:t(~u) = β(t)r0(~u) for some increasing function β : N→ R+. Also, for any ~x ∈ G and
~y ∈ simp([N ]), define the time-dependent local semi-norm by ‖~x‖2t,~y =
〈
Φ(~x), ∇2rˆ0:t(φ(~y))Φ(~x)
〉
,
and its dual time-dependent local semi-norm by ‖~x‖2t,~y,⋆ =
〈
Φ(~x), [∇2rˆ0:t(φ(~y))]−1Φ(~x)
〉
. Then for
any sequence of losses {~ℓ(t)}t∈N ⊆ G such that Φ(− 1β(t) ~L(t)) ∈ ∇rˆ0(interior(Fˆ )) for all t ∈ N, there
exists a sequence (αt)t∈N ⊆ [0, 1] such that, for all t ∈ N, the solutions ~u from the FTRL(simp([N ]),
G, {rt}t∈Z+) algorithm satisfy
〈
~ℓ(t), ~u(t)− ~u(t+ 1)
〉
≤ 1
β(t)
∥∥∥∥
(
β(t)
β(t− 1) − 1
)
~L(t− 1)− ~ℓ(t)
∥∥∥∥
0,~v(t+1),⋆
∥∥∥~ℓ(t)∥∥∥
0,~v(t+1),⋆
,
where ~v(t+ 1) = argmin~v∈simp([N ])
(〈
αt~L(t) + (1− αt) β(t)β(t−1) ~L(t− 1), ~v
〉
+ r0:t(~v)
)
.
Proof of Corollary 4. For all t ∈ N, since ~u(t), ~u(t+ 1) ∈ simp([N ]), it holds that for any ~ℓ(t) ∈ G,〈
~ℓ(t), ~u(t)− ~u(t+ 1)
〉
=
〈
~ℓ(t)− ℓi1(t)1, ~u(t)− ~u(t+ 1)
〉
=
〈
~ℓ−i1(t)− ℓ−i1(t)1, ~u−i1(t)− ~u−i1(t+ 1)
〉
=
〈
Φ(~ℓ(t)), φ(~u(t))− φ(~u(t+ 1))
〉
.
Thus, using that φ(~u(t)) are the solutions to the FTRL(Fˆ , Gˆ, {rˆt}t∈Z+) algorithm, we can apply
Lemma 5. The result then follows from observing that Φ is linear.
Lemma 6. Suppose r0 = −ψ◦H for some ψ : [0, logN ]→ R that is strictly increasing, concave, and
twice continuously differentiable on simp([N ]). Then rˆ0 is closed, strictly convex, twice continuously
differentiable on interior(Fˆ ), and of the Legendre type on Fˆ .
Moreover, for all ~y ∈ simp([N ]) and ~x ∈ G,
‖~x‖20,~y,⋆ ≤
1
ψ′(H(~y))
Var
I∼~y
[xI ].
Proof of Lemma 6. First, note that for i 6= i′ ∈ ˆ[N ] and ~µ ∈ Fˆ ,
−∂µiHˆ(~µ) = log(µi)− log (1− 〈1, ~µ〉) ,
−∂2µiHˆ(~µ) =
1
µi
+
1
1− 〈1, ~µ〉 , and
−∂µi∂µi′ Hˆ(~µ) =
1
1− 〈1, ~µ〉 .
Thus,
−∇2Hˆ(~µ) = diag(1/~µ) + 1
1− 〈1, ~µ〉11
T,
which is strictly positive-definite on interior(F ).
Therefore Hˆ is strictly concave. Since a composition of concave functions with a strictly concave
function is strictly concave, ψ ◦ Hˆ is strictly concave, which means rˆ0 is strictly convex. Since rˆ0
is continuous and finite on Fˆ , and Fˆ is closed it must also be a closed function, because a proper
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convex function is closed if it is lower-semi-continuous. The twice continuous differentiability of
rˆ0 on interior(Fˆ ) follows from the twice continuous differentiability of H on Fˆ and the twice
differentiability of ψ.
Since we have already observed that interior(Fˆ ) is convex and non-empty, to see that rˆ0 is of the
Legendre type on F we need only verify that limi→∞ ‖∇rˆ0(~µi)‖ → ∞ for any {~µi}i∈N ⊆ interior(Fˆ )
such that ~µi → ~ν ∈ ∂(Fˆ ). The gradient of rˆ0 is given by
∇rˆ0(~µ) = −[ψ′ ◦ Hˆ(~µ)]∇Hˆ(~µ).
Now, notice that if ~ν ∈ ∂(Fˆ ), Hˆ(~ν) ≤ log(N − 1). Since ψ is strictly increasing and concave
on [0, log(N)], this implies ψ′(Hˆ(~ν)) > 0. At any ~ν ∈ ∂F , either there exists an i ∈ ˆ[N ] such
that νi = 0 or 〈1, ~ν〉 = 1. In both cases, ~µi → ~ν ∈ ∂(Fˆ ) implies ‖∇Hˆ(~µi)‖ → +∞. Therefore,
∇rˆ0(~µ)→ ψ′(Hˆ(~ν)) · (+∞) = +∞, which confirms that rˆ0 is of the Legendre type on Fˆ .
To derive the semi-norm formula, first notice that using the Sherman–Morrison–Woodbury formula
gives
−[∇2Hˆ(~µ)]−1 = diag(~µ)− diag(~µ)1
(
(1− 〈1, ~µ〉) + 1T diag(~µ)1
)−1
1T diag(~µ)
= diag(~µ)− diag(~µ)11T diag(~µ)
= diag(~µ)− ~µ~µT.
(30)
Then,
∇2rˆ0(~µ) = −[ψ′′ ◦ Hˆ(~µ)](∇Hˆ(~µ))(∇Hˆ(~µ))T − [ψ′ ◦ Hˆ(~µ)](∇2Hˆ(~µ))
 −[ψ′ ◦ Hˆ(~µ)](∇2Hˆ(~µ)),
where A  B means A−B is positive semi-definite. Therefore,
[∇2rˆ0(~µ)]−1 
(
−[ψ′ ◦ Hˆ(~µ)](∇2Hˆ(~µ))
)−1
=
1
ψ′ ◦ Hˆ(~µ)
(
diag(~µ)− ~µ~µT
)
.
(31)
Applying Eqs. (30) and (31) to an arbitrary ~y ∈ simp([N ]) and ~x ∈ G gives
‖~x‖20,~y,⋆ =
〈
Φ(~x), ∇2rˆ0(φ(~y))−1Φ(~x)
〉
=
〈
~x−i1 − xi11, ∇2rˆ0(~y−i1)−1 [~x−i1 − xi11]
〉
≤ 1
ψ′ ◦ Hˆ(~y−i1)
〈
~x−i1 − xi11,
[
diag(~y−i1)− ~y−i1~yT−i1
]
[~x−i1 − xi11]
〉
=
1
ψ′ ◦H(~y)
〈
~x− xi11,
[
diag(~y)− ~y~yT
]
[~x− xi11]
〉
=
1
ψ′ ◦H(~y)VarI∼~y [xI − xi1 ]
=
1
ψ′ ◦H(~y)VarI∼~y [xI ].
Lemma 7. Suppose r0 = −ψ◦H for some ψ : [0, logN ]→ R that is strictly increasing, concave, and
twice continuously differentiable on simp([N ]). Further, suppose that r0:t = β(t)r0 for some strictly
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increasing β : N → R+. Then, [∇rˆ0](interior(Fˆ )) = R ˆ[N ], and the solutions from FTRL(simp([N ]),
G, {rt}t∈Z+) are equivalent to the weights played by Hedge with an implicitly defined learning rate.
In particular, they are defined by the solution to the system of equations
ηˆ(t+ 1) =
1
β(t) · ψ′ ◦H(~u(t+ 1))
~u(t+ 1) =
(
exp (−ηˆ(t+ 1)Li(t))∑
i′∈[N ] exp (−ηˆ(t+ 1)Li′(t))
)
i∈[N ]
.
(32)
Moreover, for any sequence of losses {~ℓ(t)}t∈N ⊆ G, this system has a unique solution satisfying
ηˆ(t+ 1) ∈
[
1
β(t) · ψ′(0) ,
1
β(t) · ψ′(logN)
]
.
Proof of Lemma 7. First, recall that solutions from the FTRL(simp([N ]), G, {rt}t∈Z+) algorithm
with this specific rt sequence will solve
~u(t+ 1) = argmin
~w∈simp([N ])
{〈
~L(t), ~w
〉
− β(t)ψ(H(~w))
}
= φ−1
(
argmin
~µ∈Fˆ
{〈
~L−i1(t)− 1Li1(t), ~µ
〉
− β(t)ψ(Hˆ(~µ))
})
.
By Lemma 6 and Corollary 3, we know that this means ~u(t + 1) = φ−1(~µ) for the unique ~µ ∈
interior(Fˆ ) such that
∇Hˆ(~µ) = −
~L−i1(t)− 1Li1(t)
β(t) · ψ′(Hˆ(~µ)) .
Thus, by the definition of φ and Hˆ,
∇Hˆ(~u−i1(t+ 1)) = −
~L−i1(t)− 1Li1(t)
β(t) · ψ′(Hˆ(~u−i1(t+ 1)))
= −
~L−i1(t)− 1Li1(t)
β(t) · ψ′(H(~u(t+ 1))) . (33)
Now, for Hedge, β(t) = 1/η(t+ 1) and ψ(x) = x, so ψ′(x) = 1 and Eq. (33) becomes
∇Hˆ(~w−i1(t+ 1)) = −η(t+ 1)[~L−i1(t)− 1Li1(t)].
This has the familiar solution
~w(t+ 1) =
(
exp{−η(t+ 1)Li(t)}∑
i′∈[N ] exp{−η(t+ 1)Li′(t)}
)
i∈[N ]
. (34)
Applying this notational equivalence to Eq. (33) gives exactly Eq. (32).
Next, we want to show that there is a unique solution to the implicit equation defined by
ηˆ(t+ 1) =
1
β(t) · ψ′ ◦H
((
exp{−ηˆ(t+1)Li(t)}∑
i′∈[N] exp{−ηˆ(t+1)Li′ (t)}
)
i∈[N ]
) .
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On the left hand side, we have f1(η) = η, which is trivially strictly increasing from 0 to
1
β(t)·ψ′(logN)
as η increases from 0 to 1β(t)·ψ′(logN) . On the right hand side, we have
f2(η) =
1
β(t) · ψ′ ◦H
((
exp{−ηˆ(t+1)Li(t)}∑
i′∈[N] exp{−ηˆ(t+1)Li′ (t)}
)
i∈[N ]
) ,
which is non-increasing with f2(0) =
1
β(t)·ψ′(logN) . Further, by non-negativity of entropy and con-
cavity of ψ, f2(η) ≥ 1β(t)·ψ′(0) . Thus, f1 and f2 must intersect at some η ∈
[
1
β(t)·ψ′(0) ,
1
β(t)·ψ′(logN)
]
,
and this intersection is unique by the monotonicity of both functions and the strict monotonicity
of f1.
This guarantees at least one interior point solution to the implicit equation for the FTRL(simp([N ]),
G, {rt}t∈Z+) problem. Moreover, since the FTRL(simp([N ]), G, {rt}t∈Z+) objective is strictly convex,
this interior point solution must be the unique optimizer of the objective. Finally, since the sequence
of losses was arbitrary and FTRL(Fˆ , Gˆ, {rˆt}t∈Z+) has a unique solution at each time t+1, we conclude
that [∇rˆ0](interior(F )) = R ˆ[N ] as otherwise there would be some loss vector for which the solution
does not exist.
F Proofs of Helper Lemmas for Appendix C
F.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. First, observe that
H(~u) = −
∑
i∈[N ]
ui log (ui) = −
∑
i◦∈I◦
ui◦ log (ui◦)−
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
ui log (ui) .
To bound the first term, consider the optimization problem
min
〈1, ~u〉=1
〈1, ~uI◦〉≤1
∑
i◦∈I◦
ui◦ log (ui◦) ,
where ~uI◦
def
= {~ui◦}i◦∈I◦ . This is a convex objective with linear constraints, so it can be solved
using the Lagrange multiplier method. The Lagrangian is
L(~u;α, β) =
∑
i◦∈I◦
ui◦ log (ui◦) + α (〈1, ~u〉 − 1) + β (〈1, ~uI◦〉 − 1) ,
and the dual problem is
max
α∈R
β≥0
min
~u∈R[N]
∑
i◦∈I◦
ui◦ log (ui◦) + α (〈1, ~u〉 − 1) + β (〈1, ~uI◦〉 − 1) .
This gives, for i◦ ∈ [N ] and i ∈ [N ] \ I◦,
∂i◦L(~u;α, β) = log(ui◦) + 1 + α+ β, and
∂iL(~u;α, β) = α.
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Then, at the saddle point, α = 0 and log ui◦ = − 11+β for all i◦ ∈ I◦.
If β = 0 then ui◦ =
1
exp(1) for all i◦ ∈ I◦. This is only feasible if N◦ ≤ 2. In this case
∑
i◦∈I◦
ui◦ log (ui◦) ≥ −
∑
i◦∈I◦
log(exp(1))
exp(1)
= − N◦
exp(1)
.
Otherwise β > 0, and by the K.K.T. condition, 〈1, ~uI◦〉 = 1, which implies that ~ui◦ = 1N◦ for all
i◦ ∈ I◦. That is, ∑
i◦∈I◦
ui◦ log (ui◦) ≥ −
∑
i◦∈I◦
log(N◦)
N◦
= − log(N◦).
Thus for N◦ ≥ 3
H(~u) ≤ log(N◦)−
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
ui log ui, (35)
and for N◦ ≤ 2
H(~u) ≤ N◦
exp(1)
−
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
ui log ui. (36)
Further, if I◦ = {i◦}, since log(x) ≥ 1− 1/x for all x ≥ 0,
H(~u) = −
∑
i∈[N ]
ui log (ui)
= −ui◦ log (ui◦)−
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
ui log (ui)
≤ −ui◦
(
1− 1
ui◦
)
−
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
ui log (ui)
= (1− ui◦)−
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
ui log (ui)
≤ 1−
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
ui log (ui) .
(37)
In order to control the sum over ineffective experts we use the technical result of Lemma 9, which
says that
−
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
ui log (ui) ≤ 1
(1− p) exp(1)
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
[ui]
p
(38)
Combing Eqs. (35) to (38) gives for N◦ ≥ 1,
H(~u) ≤ 2
exp(1) log(2)
log(N◦) +
(
1 +
1
(1− p) exp(1)
) ∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
upi .
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F.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. For the first result, observe that from Theorem 5, ~u(t+1) is the unique solution
to
ηˆ(t+ 1) =
1√
t+ 1 · ψ′ ◦H(~u(t+ 1))
~u(t+ 1) =
(
exp (−ηˆ(t+ 1)Li(t))∑
i′∈[N ] exp (−ηˆ(t+ 1)Li′(t))
)
i∈[N ]
,
and
ηˆ(t+ 1) ∈
[
1√
t+ 1 · [ψ′(0)] ,
1√
t+ 1 · [ψ′(logN)]
]
.
Now, set η(t+1) = 1√
t+1·ψ′(0) , and let π ∈ Π(Dℓ) be arbitrary. For i ∈ [N ]\I◦, since η(t+1) ≤ ηˆ(t+1)
and LI∗(t) ≤ Li(t) by definition,
[
ui(t+ 1)
]p ≤
(
ui(t+ 1)
uI∗(t)(t+ 1)
)p
= exp
{
− p ηˆ(t+ 1)
[
Li(t)− LI∗(t)(t)
] }
≤ exp
{
− p η(t+ 1)
[
Li(t)− LI∗(t)(t)
] }
= min
i′∈[N ]
exp
{
− p η(t+ 1) [Li(t)− Li′(t)]
}
≤ min
i◦∈I◦
exp
{
− p η(t+ 1) [Li(t)− Li◦(t)]
}
.
Thus, using Theorem 1,
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
[
ui(t+ 1)
p
]
≤ sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
[
min
i◦∈I◦
exp
{
− p η(t+ 1) [Li(t)− Li◦(t)]
}]
≤ exp
{
−tη(t+ 1)∆◦p+ tη(t+ 1)2 p
2
2
}
= exp

−t 1√t+ 1 · ψ′(0)∆◦p+ t
(
1√
t+ 1 · ψ′(0)
)2
p2
2


= exp
{
− ∆◦p
ψ′(0)
t√
t+ 1
+
t
t+ 1
p2
2(ψ′(0))2
}
≤ exp
{
p2
2(ψ′(0))2
}
exp
{
− ∆◦p
ψ′(0)
t√
t+ 1
}
≤ exp
{
p2
2(ψ′(0))2
}
exp
{
− ∆◦p√
2(ψ′(0))
√
t
}
,
where in the last inequality we used the fact that tt+1 ≥ 12 for t ∈ N.
For the second result, for each α ∈ [0, 1], we define the intermediate losses ~ξ(α)(t) = α~L(t) + (1 −
α)
√
t+1√
t
~L(t−1). We define a new random expert by Iˆ∗α(t) = argmini∈[N ] ξ(α)i (t), which is analogous
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to I∗(t) but for ~ξ(α)(t). Then, applying Lemma 7 to the intermediate losses, observe that ~v(α)(t+1)
is the unique solution to
ϑˆ(α)(t+ 1) =
1√
t+ 1 · ψ′ ◦H(~v(α)(t+ 1))
~v(α)(t+ 1) =

 exp
(
−ϑˆ(α)(t+ 1)ξ(α)i (t)
)
∑
i′∈[N ] exp
(
−ϑˆ(α)(t+ 1)ξ(α)i′ (t)
)


i∈[N ]
,
and
ϑˆ(α)(t+ 1) ∈
[
1√
t+ 1 · [ψ′(0)] ,
1√
t+ 1 · [ψ′(logN)]
]
.
Next, using that ~ℓi(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ [N ],
ξ
(α)
i (t) = α
~Li(t) + (1− α)
√
t+ 1
t
~Li(t− 1)
≥ α~Li(t) + (1− α)~Li(t− 1)
≥ α~Li(t) + (1− α)[~Li(t)− 1]
≥ ~Li(t)− 1.
Then, observe that since Li(t) ≤ t for all i ∈ [N ],
√
t+1√
t
Li(t− 1) ≤ Li(t− 1)+ 1 for all t ∈ N. Thus,
for any i′ ∈ [N ],
ξ
(α)
i′ (t) = α
~Li′(t) + (1− α)
√
t+ 1
t
~Li′(t− 1)
≤ α~Li′(t) + (1− α)[~Li′(t− 1) + 1]
≤ α~Li′(t) + (1− α)[~Li′(t) + 1]
≤ ~Li′(t) + 1.
Combining these two facts gives that for all α ∈ [0, 1]
ξ
(α)
i (t)− ξ(α)i′ (t) ≥ ~Li(t)− ~Li′(t)− 2.
Now, for i ∈ [N ] \ I◦, taking η(t+ 1) = 1√t+1·ψ′(0) , and since η(t+ 1) ≤ ϑˆ(t+ 1) we have
[
v
(α)
i (t+ 1)
]p ≤

 v(α)i (t+ 1)
v
(α)
Iˆ∗α(t)
(t+ 1)


p
= exp
{
−p ϑˆ(α)(t+ 1)
[
ξ
(α)
i (t)− ξ(α)Iˆ∗α(t)(t)
]}
≤ exp
{
−p η(t+ 1)
[
ξ
(α)
i (t)− ξ(α)Iˆ∗α(t)(t)
]}
= min
i′∈[N ]
exp
{
− p η(t+ 1)
[
ξ
(α)
i (t)− ξ(α)i′ (t)
] }
≤ min
i◦∈I◦
exp
{
− p η(t+ 1)
[
ξ
(α)
i (t)− ξ(α)i◦ (t)
] }
≤ min
i◦∈I◦
exp {−p η(t+ 1) [Li(t)− Li◦(t)− 2]} .
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Thus, again using Theorem 1,
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ sup
α∈[0,1]
[
vi(t+ 1)
p
]
≤ sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
[
min
i◦∈I◦
exp {−p η(t+ 1) [Li(t)− Li◦(t)− 2]}
]
≤ exp
{
2pη(t+ 1)− tη(t+ 1)∆◦p+ tη(t+ 1)2 p
2
2
}
= exp
{
2p−∆◦pt√
t+ 1 · ψ′(0) +
(
1√
t+ 1 · ψ′(0)
)2
p2t
2
}
= exp
{
2p
ψ′(0)
1√
t+ 1
− ∆◦p
ψ′(0)
t√
t+ 1
+
t
t+ 1
p2
2(ψ′(0))2
}
≤ exp
{
2p
ψ′(0)
+
p2
2(ψ′(0))2
}
exp
{
− ∆◦p
ψ′(0)
t√
t+ 1
}
≤ exp
{
2p
ψ′(0)
+
p2
2(ψ′(0))2
}
exp
{
− ∆◦p√
2(ψ′(0))
√
t
}
,
where in the last inequality we again used the fact that tt+1 ≥ 12 for t ∈ N.
F.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. First, note that H(~u) ≤ log(N) for any ~u ∈ simp([N ]). Second, since √t+ 1−√
t ≤ 1
2
√
t
for t ≥ 1,
(√
t+1
t − 1
)
∈
[
0, 12t
]
. Combined with ~ℓ(t) ∈ [0, 1][N ] for all t ∈ N, this gives
that for all i ∈ [N ], (√
t+ 1
t
− 1
)
Li(t− 1)− ℓi(t) ∈
[
−1, 1
2
]
.
Thus, since if a ≤ X ≤ b then Var(X) ≤ (b− a)2/4,
Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[(√
t+ 1
t
− 1
)
LI(t− 1)− ℓI(t)
]
≤ 9
16
and Var
I∼~v(t+1)
[ℓI(t)] ≤ 1
4
.
Plugging these into Eq. (3) using β(t) =
√
t+ 1, ψ increasing and concave, and the fact that
H(~u) ≤ log(N) gives
RˆFTRLH (t0) ≤ −ψ(0)
√
t0 + 1 +
t0∑
t=0
[√
t+ 1−
√
t
]
ψ(log(N)) +
t0∑
t=1
3
8
√
t+ 1 · ψ′(log(N)) .
=
√
t0 + 1
(
ψ(log(N))− ψ(0)
)
+
t0∑
t=1
3
8
√
t+ 1 · ψ′(log(N)) .
Then, since
t0∑
t=1
1√
t+ 1
≤
∫ t0
0
1√
t+ 1
dt = 2
√
t0 + 1,
we have that
RˆFTRLH (t0) ≤
√
t0 + 1
(
ψ(log(N))− ψ(0) + 3
4ψ′(log(N))
)
.
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F.4 Miscellaneous Stochastic and Mathematical Results
Here we state a couple convenient results that will be used repeatedly, but require none of the
assumptions of our setting. The first of these lemmas allows us to control the variance of the
experts’ losses under the player’s weight distribution.
Lemma 8. Suppose ν is a distribution such that Support(ν) ⊂ [−y, 1 − y] and x ∈ [−y, 1 − y]. If
X ∼ αδx + (1− α)ν,then
Var(X) ≤
{
α(1 − α) : α ≥ 1/2
1/4 : α < 1/2
.
Proof of Lemma 8. Since variance is invariant to shifts, we can suppose y = 0 without loss of
generality. Define µν = EZ∼ν(Z) and σ2ν = VarZ∼ν(Z). Then, using the variance for a mixture
distribution,
Var(X) = αx2 + (1− α)µ2ν − (αx+ (1− α)µν)2 + (1− α)σ2ν
= α(1− α)x2 + α(1 − α)µ2ν − 2α(1 − α)xµν + (1− α)σ2ν
= α(1− α)(x − µν)2 + (1− α)σ2ν
Now,
sup
x,ν
Var(X) = sup
x,µ
sup
ν:µν=µ
Var(X).
The inner sup is achieved by ν(µ) = Ber(µ) and has σ2ν(µ) = µ(1− µ), so that
sup
x,ν
Var(X) = sup
µ
sup
x
α(1− α)(x− µ)2 + (1− α)µ(1− µ).
Now, the inner sup is achieved by x = 0 when µ ≥ 1/2 and by x = 1 when µ < 1/2. Due to
symmetry we need only consider the case that µ ≥ 1/2.
sup
x,ν
Var(X) = sup
µ
α(1− α)µ2 + (1− α)µ(1 − µ)
= sup
µ
[
−(1− α)2µ2 + (1− α)µ
]
.
Since µ ∈ [0, 1] this is a constrained quadratic maximum. If the unconstrained maximum occurs
in interior of the region then it is equal to the constrained maximum. Otherwise the constrained
maximum occurs at the boundary.
The unconstrained maximum occurs at µ = 12(1−α) with objective value 1/4. This in the interior
of the constraint region when (1−α) > 1/2; equivalently α < 1/2. The boundary values are 0 and
α(1 − α).
Next, we have a simple fact about logarithms which will be useful when controlling the entropy of
weight distributions.
Lemma 9. For x ∈ (0, 1] and p ∈ (0, 1)
−x log(x) ≤ 1
(1− p) exp(1)x
p
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Proof of Lemma 9. Consider f(x) = −x1−p log(x). Then, f(0+) = f(0), f(1) = 0, and
f ′(x) = −(1− p)x−p log(x)− x−p = −x−p((1− p) log(x) + 1).
Thus, the only critical point of f occurs at x0 = exp(−1/(1 − p)). This is a local max since
sign(f ′(x)) = − sign(x−x0) for x ∈ (0, 1). Thus, f is maximized on the interval (0, 1) at x0. Hence
f(x) ≤ f(x0) = 1(1−p) exp(1) . Multiplying both sides by xp proves the result.
Finally, we have a result which controls a summation term which appears often in our proofs.
Lemma 10. For any α and t0 ≥ 1
T∑
t=t0+1
1√
t
exp
{
−α√t
}
≤ 2
α
exp(−α√t0)
Proof of Lemma 10.
T∑
t=t0+1
1√
t
exp
{
−α√t
}
≤
∫ T
t0
1√
t
exp
{
−α√t
}
dt
≤
∫ ∞
t0
1√
t
exp
{
−α√t
}
dt
=
∫ ∞
√
t0
2 exp {−αu} du
=
2
α
exp(−α√t0)
G Upper Bound for Meta-CARE
We do not state a detailed quantitative form of Theorem 4, since the exact constants can be
obtained from the statements and proofs of Theorems 6 and 7.
Proof of Theorem 4. As in the case of Hedge and FTRL-CARE, we bound supπ∈Π(Dℓ) Eπ,πˆRˆMeta(T )
even under some arbitrary alternative player policy πˆ ∈ Πˆ generating the predictions used in the
histories. It is in this richer setting that we will prove the result.
For N◦ ≥ 2, we decompose the regret of Meta-CARE into components coming from the regret due to
meta-learning and the regret of the better of the two meta-experts. In particular, for any sequence
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of losses (~ℓ(t))t∈N, we can write
RˆMeta(T ) =
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
− min
i∈[N ]
T∑
t=1
ℓi(t)
=
[
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−min
(
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)]
+
[
min
(
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)
− min
i∈[N ]
T∑
t=1
ℓi(t)
]
=
[
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−min
(
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)]
+min
(
RˆHedge(T ), RˆCARE(T )
)
.
Therefore,
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆMeta(T ) ≤ sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
[
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−min
(
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)]
+ sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆmin
(
RˆHedge(T ), RˆCARE(T )
)
.
First, since Meta-CARE is Hedge with two experts given by the predictions of Hedge and FTRL-CARE,
Theorem 6 implies that
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
[
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−min
(
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)]
≤ √T + 1
(
log(2)
cMeta
+
3cMeta
4
)
≤ K1,1
√
T .
For some universal constant K1,1 > 0. Now, note that
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆmin
(
RˆHedge(T ), RˆCARE(T )
)
≤ sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
min
(
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T ),Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T )
)
≤ min
(
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T ), sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T )
)
≤ sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T ).
From Theorem 7, there are universal constants K1,2,K3 > 0 such that
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆCARE(T ) ≤ K1,2
√
T log(N◦) +K3
[log(N)]3/2
∆◦
.
Combining these, for the N◦ ≥ 2 case we have (for some universal constant K1 > 0)
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆMeta(T ) ≤ K1,1
√
T +K1,2
√
T log(N◦) +K3
[log(N)]3/2
∆◦
≤ K1
√
T log(N◦) +K3
[log(N)]3/2
∆◦
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Now consider the case where I◦ = {i◦}, so that N◦ = 1. Using a similar decomposition to the
previous case, we have
RˆMeta(T ) =
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
− min
i∈[N ]
T∑
t=1
ℓi(t)
=
[
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉]
+
[
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
− min
i∈[N ]
T∑
t=1
ℓi(t)
]
=
[
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−
T∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉]
+ RˆHedge(T ).
Let t0 =
⌈
2[log(N)+3cCARE,1
√
cCARE,2+
5
4
c2
CARE,1cCARE,2]
2
c2
CARE,1cCARE,2∆
2◦
⌉
(i.e., the same t0 as in Theorem 7). Then, for some
universal constant K2,1 > 0, t0 ≤ K2,1
(
(logN)2
∆2◦
)
. We expand the regret of Meta-CARE as:
RˆMeta(T ) =
[
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉]
+

 T∑
t=t0+1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−
T∑
t=t0+1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉+ RˆHedge(T )
≤
[
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−min
(
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)]
+

 T∑
t=t0+1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−
T∑
t=t0+1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉+ RˆHedge(T )
≤
[
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−min
(
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)]
+
T∑
t=t0+1
1
2
‖~ш(t)− ~w(t)‖L1 + RˆHedge(T )
≤
[
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−min
(
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)]
+
T∑
t=t0+1
1
2
‖ ~̟ (t)− ~w(t)‖L1 + RˆHedge(T ).
Therefore,
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆMeta(T ) ≤ sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
[
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−min
(
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)]
+ sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
∞∑
t=t0
1
2
‖ ~̟ (t)− ~w(t)‖L1 + sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T ).
Again using the fact that Meta-CARE is Hedge with two experts given by the predictions of Hedge
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and FTRL-CARE, by Theorem 6 we have (for some universal constant K2,2 > 0)
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
[
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~ш(t)
〉
−min
(
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~w(t)
〉
,
t0∑
t=1
〈
~ℓ(t), ~̟ (t)
〉)]
≤ K1,1
√
t0
≤ K2,2 logN
∆◦
.
(39)
Next, using that 1−wi◦(t) =
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦ wi(t) and the same fact for ~̟ , for some universal constant
K2,3 > 0
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
∞∑
t=t0
1
2
‖ ~̟ (t)− ~w(t)‖L1 ≤ sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
∞∑
t=t0
1
2
(‖ ~̟ (t)− δi◦‖L1 + ‖~w(t)− δi◦‖L1)
= sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆ
T∑
t=t0
∑
i∈[N ]\I◦
(
wi(t) +̟i(t)
)
≤ K2,3 1
∆◦
,
(40)
where the last step follows from the same arguments as in the proofs of Theorems 6 and 7. Finally,
from Theorem 6, we have (for some universal constant K2,4 > 0)
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆHedge(T ) ≤ K2,4
(
log(N)
∆◦
)
. (41)
Combining Eqs. (39) to (41) shows that in the case of N◦ = 1, we have (for some universal constant
K2)
sup
π∈Π(Dℓ)
Eπ,πˆRˆMeta(T ) ≤ K2 log(N)
∆◦
.
Taking the maximum of these universal constants gives the statement of the theorem.
H Proofs of Lower Bounds
H.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. The policy we take is to define a simple setting with multiple experts (many
of them identical), so that we can show the lower bound holds in the asymptotic limit as T and N
tends to infinity. Let Y = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}, Yˆ = simp([3]), and ℓ(yˆ, y) = 12
∑3
i=1 |yˆi − yi|.
Observe that ℓ(yˆ, y) ∈ [0, 1] for all yˆ ∈ Yˆ and y ∈ Y. Let N◦ ≤ N ∈ N.
In this setting, consider the distribution
µ◦ =
((
1
2
δ(1,0,0) +
1
2
δ(0,1,0)
)⊗N◦
⊗ (δ(0,0,1))⊗(N−N◦)
)
⊗
(
1
2
δ(1,0,0) +
1
2
δ(0,1,0)
)
,
and let D = {µ◦}. Then Π(D) contains a single policy, π⋆, given by
π⋆ = (h(t) ∈ Ht 7→ µ◦)t∈N.
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Intuitively, each of the effective experts flips a coin to play the first or second element, but the ob-
servation is also either the first or second element from an independent coin toss, and the ineffective
experts always output the third element.
Now, define the pushforward of the distribution through the loss function by µℓ◦ = ℓ♯µ◦ to obtain
the single loss distribution on the experts. Observe this simplifies to
µℓ◦ = Ber(1/2)
⊗N◦ ⊗ Ber(1)⊗(N−N◦).
This singleton policy space satisfies the time-homogeneous convex constraint condition with I◦ =
[N◦], and ∆◦ = 1/2.
Note that any prediction yˆ has E
y∼µ◦
ℓ(yˆ, y) ≥ 12 . For each i◦ ∈ I◦, let Mi◦
def
=
∑T
t=1 ℓ(yˆi◦ , y) be
the random variable corresponding to the cumulative loss of the effective expert. Then, Mi◦
iid∼
Bin(T, 1/2), and
inf
πˆ∈Πˆ
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆmax
i∈[N ]
[
T∑
t=1
(
ℓ(yˆ(t), y(t)) − ℓ(yˆ[N ](t), y(t))
)]
≥ E
M∼Bin(T,1/2)⊗N◦
max
i◦∈I◦
(
T/2 −Mi◦
)
.
Now, since 2√
T
(T/2 −Mi◦) are I.I.D. and converge in Wasserstein distance to a N(0, 1) as T →∞
(from, for example, Chen et al. (2010, Theorem 3.1)), and since max is Lipschitz,
lim
T→∞
E
M∼Bin(T,1/2)⊗N◦
(
max
i◦∈I◦
1√
T
(T/2−Mi◦)
)
=
1
2
E
Z∼N(0,1)⊗N◦
(
max
i◦∈I◦
Zi◦
)
.
We now turn to the non-asymptotic lower bound of Kamath (2015), which states that for all N◦ ∈ N
E
Z∼N(0,1)⊗N◦
(
maxi◦∈I◦ Zi◦
)
0.23
√
logN◦
≥ 1,
Now, by the definition of limit, for each N◦ there exists a t0(N◦) such that for T ≥ t0(N◦)
E
M∼Bin(T,1/2)⊗N◦
(
max
i◦∈I◦
1√
T
(T/2−Mi◦)
)
≥
(
0.2
0.23
)(
1
2
)
E
Z∼N(0,1)⊗N◦
(
max
i◦∈I◦
Zi◦
)
≥
√
(log |N◦|) /100 .
Combining these facts, we have that for any N ∈ N, N◦ ≤ N and T ≥ t0(N◦),
inf
πˆ∈Πˆ
sup
π∈Π(D)
Eπ,πˆmaxi∈[N ]
∑T
t=1 [ℓ(yˆ(t), y(t))− ℓ(yˆi(t), y(t))]√
T log(N◦)/100
≥ 1.
H.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. In order to prove both cases of the Hedge lower bound, our approach is first
to define a specific example of a D ∈ V(N,N◦). Then, for either case we find a specific policy
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π ∈ Π(D) which forces the Hedge algorithm to incur at least as much regret as the desired lower
bound. It turns out that we do not need anything more complicated than a D that consists of
convex combinations of deterministic experts.
In particular, consider [N ] = [N ], and for simplicity suppose that N◦ is even. (The argument is
the same, but with some more housekeeping, when N◦ is odd.) We wish to split [N ] up so that
I◦ = [N◦], and thus [N ] \ I◦ = [N ] \ [N◦]. To do so, we define
U =
{
δ⊗N◦/2m ⊗ δ⊗N◦/21−m ⊗ δ⊗(N−N◦)1 s.t. m ∈ {0, 1}
}
∪
{
δ0 ⊗ δ⊗(N−1)1
}
.
This set consists of three different expert loss distributions. In each of these, the incurred loss of
any expert is assigned either a Dirac measure at 0 or at 1. Thus, the three distributions are defined
by which experts incur loss of 0 (with the rest incurring loss of 1). These options are either: a) the
first N◦/2 incur loss of 0, b) the experts labelled N◦/2 + 1 to N◦ incur loss of 0, and c) only the
first expert incurs loss of 0.
Then, we can define D to be the pullback (under ℓ) of the convex hull of U . One can check that any
convex combination of the three distributions in U can only lead to an expert in I◦ being optimal
in expectation, and additionally note that ∆◦ = 1/2. Consequently, D ∈ V(N,N◦), so it remains
to find a π ∈ Π(D) that forces Hedge to incur the two learning rates of the theorem.
Before we do this, we first recall the adversarial analysis of Hedge by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
(2006, Theorem 2.3). Similar to that analysis, we will analyze the telescoping series
Ψ(t) =
1
η(t+ 1)
log(wI∗(t)(t+ 1)) −
1
η(t)
log(wI∗(t−1)(t)),
which, for an arbitrary t0, satisfies
T∑
t=t0+1
Ψ(t) =
1
η(T + 1)
log(wI∗(T )(T + 1)) −
1
η(t0 + 1)
log(wI∗(t0)(t0 + 1)).
When upper bounding, Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi used that the first term was negative and kept
the second term, but we now wish to use that the second term is positive to obtain
T∑
t=t0+1
Ψ(t) ≥ 1
η(T + 1)
log(wI∗(T )(T + 1)). (42)
Then, we can partition −Ψ(t) into
−Ψ(t) =
(
1
η(t+ 1)
− 1
η(t)
)
log
(
1
wI∗(t)(t+ 1)
)
+
1
η(t)
log


exp{−η(t)LI∗(t)(t)}∑
i∈[N] exp{−η(t)Li(t)}
exp{−η(t+1)LI∗(t)(t)}∑
i∈[N] exp{−η(t+1)Li(t)}


+
1
η(t)
log
( ∑
i∈[N ] exp {−η(t)Li(t)}∑
i∈[N ] exp {−η(t)Li(t− 1)}
)
+
[
LI∗(t)(t)− LI∗(t−1)(t− 1)
]
.
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Observe that
1
η(t)
log
( ∑
i∈[N ] exp {−η(t)Li(t)}∑
i∈[N ] exp {−η(t)Li(t− 1)}
)
=
1
η(t)
log

∑
i∈[N ]
exp {−η(t)Li(t− 1)}∑
i′∈[N ] exp {−η(t)Li′(t− 1)}
exp {−η(t)ℓi(t)}


=
1
η(t)
log

∑
i∈[N ]
wi(t) exp {−η(t)ℓi(t)}


= −
∑
i∈[N ]
wi(t)ℓi(t) +
1
η(t)
log

exp

η(t)
∑
i∈[N ]
wi(t)ℓi(t)


∑
i∈[N ]
wi(t) exp {−η(t)ℓi(t)}


= −
∑
i∈[N ]
wi(t)ℓi(t) +
1
η(t)
log

∑
i∈[N ]
wi(t) exp

η(t)

−ℓi(t) + ∑
i′∈[N ]
wi′(t)ℓi′(t)





 .
Thus, we can write
−Ψ(t) =
(
1
η(t+ 1)
− 1
η(t)
)
log
(
1
wI∗(t)(t+ 1)
)
+
1
η(t)
log


exp{−η(t)LI∗(t)(t)}∑
i∈[N] exp{−η(t)Li(t)}
exp{−η(t+1)LI∗(t)(t)}∑
i∈[N] exp{−η(t+1)Li(t)}


−
∑
i∈[N ]
wi(t)ℓi(t) +
1
η(t)
log
(
E
I∼~w(t)
exp
{
η(t)
(
−ℓI(t)− E
I′∼~w(t)
[−ℓI′(t)]
)})
+
[
LI∗(t)(t)− LI∗(t−1)(t− 1)
]
def
= A(t) +B(t) +C1(t) + C2(t) +D(t).
(43)
First, observe that since η(t) is decreasing in both cases, B(t) ≥ 0. Also,
T∑
t=t0+1
A(t) =
T∑
t=t0+1
(
1
η(t+ 1)
− 1
η(t)
)
log
(
1
wI∗(t)(t+ 1)
)
,
T∑
t=t0+1
C1(t) = −
T∑
t=t0+1
∑
i∈[N ]
wi(t)ℓi(t),
T∑
t=t0+1
C2(t) =
T∑
t=t0+1
1
η(t)
log
(
E
I∼~w(t)
exp
{
η(t)
(
−ℓI(t)− E
I′∼~w(t)
[−ℓI′(t)]
)})
, and
T∑
t=t0+1
D(t) = LI∗(T )(T )− LI∗(t0)(t0).
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Thus, combining these with Eq. (42) gives
− 1
η(T + 1)
log(wI∗(T )(T + 1))
≥ −
T∑
t=t0+1
Ψ(t)
≥
T∑
t=t0+1
(
1
η(t+ 1)
− 1
η(t)
)
log
(
1
wI∗(t)(t+ 1)
)
−
T∑
t=t0+1
∑
i∈[N ]
wi(t)ℓi(t)
+
T∑
t=t0+1
1
η(t)
log
(
E
I∼~w(t)
exp
{
η(t)
(
−ℓI(t)− E
I′∼~w(t)
[−ℓI′(t)]
)})
+ LI∗(T )(T )− LI∗(t0)(t0).
Rearranging, we see that
RˆHedge(T )− RˆHedge(t0) ≥ 1
η(T + 1)
log(wI∗(T )(T + 1)) +
T∑
t=t0+1
(
1
η(t+ 1)
− 1
η(t)
)
log
(
1
wI∗(t)(t+ 1)
)
+
T∑
t=t0+1
1
η(t)
log
(
E
I∼~w(t)
exp
{
η(t)
(
−ℓI(t)− E
I′∼~w(t)
[−ℓI′(t)]
)})
.
(44)
The way we bound these terms will depend on the specific learning rate and data-generating
mechanism chosen for that learning rate.
H.2.1 Hedge with η(t) = c
√
log(N)/t
First, we consider the case of playing Hedge with η(t) = c
√
log(N)/t. We define the data-generating
mechanism π such that at round t the loss distribution on [N ] is
µt =

δ
⊗(N◦/2)
0 ⊗ δ⊗(N−N◦/2)1 : t odd
δ
⊗(N◦/2)
1 ⊗ δ⊗(N◦/2)0 ⊗ δ⊗(N−N◦)1 : t even.
That is, on even and odd rounds the environment alternates between the first half of I◦ incurring
loss of 0 and the second half of I◦ incurring loss of 0, with the remaining experts always incurring
loss of 1. Both of these distributions are actually in U , so their pullback is trivially in D.
Now, due to the deterministic nature of π, we can exactly determine what ~w(t) will look like. In
particular, we have that
Li(t) =


t−1
2 : t odd, and i ∈ [N◦/2]
t+1
2 : t odd, and i ∈ [N◦] \ [N◦/2]
t
2 : t even, and i ∈ [N◦]
t : i 6∈ [N◦] .
(45)
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Thus, recognizing that wi(t) uses Li(t− 1) and letting θ(t) = exp
{
−η(t) (t−1)2
}
,
wi(t) =


[N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)]−1 : t odd, and i ∈ [N◦]
θ(t)[N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)]−1 : t odd, and i 6∈ [N◦]
exp(η(t)/2)[N◦ cosh(η(t)/2) + (N −N◦)θ(t)]−1 : t even, and i ∈ [N◦/2]
exp(−η(t)/2)[N◦ cosh(η(t)/2) + (N −N◦)θ(t)]−1 : t even, and i ∈ [N◦] \ [N◦/2]
θ(t)[N◦ cosh(η(t)/2) + (N −N◦)θ(t)]−1 : t even, and i 6∈ [N◦] .
(46)
The next thing to observe is that for all t, I∗(t) ∈ [N◦] a.s., and
wI∗(t)(t+ 1) =
{
[N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t+ 1)]−1 : t+ 1 odd
exp(η(t+ 1)/2)[N◦ cosh(η(t+ 1)/2) + (N −N◦)θ(t+ 1)]−1 : t+ 1 even.
(47)
Now, let t0 =
⌊
16 log(N)
c2
⌋
and suppose t ≥ t0 + 1. Then, using x√x+1 ≥ 12
√
x for x ≥ 1,
θ(t) ≤ θ(t+ 1) = exp
{
−c
√
log(N)√
t+ 1
t
2
}
≤ exp
{
−c
√
log(N)t
4
}
≤ exp
{
−c
√
16 log(N) log(N)
4c
}
=
1
N
.
This gives
1
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t+ 1) ≥
1
N◦ + (N −N◦)/N ≥
1
N◦ + 1
. (48)
Also, exp {η(t+ 1)/2} ≥ 1, so
cosh
(
η(t+ 1)
2
)
=
1
2
[
exp
{
c
√
log(N)
2
√
t+ 1
}
+ exp
{
−c
√
log(N)
2
√
t+ 1
}]
≤ 1
2
[
exp
{
c2
√
log(N)
2
√
16 log(N)
}
+ 1
]
≤ exp
{
c2/8
}
.
Thus,
exp {η(t+ 1)/2}
N◦ cosh(η(t+ 1)/2) + (N −N◦)θ(t+ 1) ≥
1
exp {c2/8}N◦ + 1 ,
which combined with Eq. (48) gives that for all t ≥ t0 + 1,
wI∗(t)(t+ 1) ≥
1
exp {c2/8}N◦ + 1 .
This observation shows that if T ≥ t0 + 1,
1
η(T + 1)
log(wI∗(T )(T + 1)) ≥ −
√
T + 1
c
√
log(N)
[
c2/8 + log(N◦ + 1)
]
. (49)
In order to control the terms of Eq. (44), we first observe that
T∑
t=t0+1
(
1
η(t+ 1)
− 1
η(t)
)
log
(
1
wI∗(t)(t+ 1)
)
≥ 0.
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Then, we will use Eq. (49) to lower bound the first term on the RHS of Eq. (44). We now turn to
controlling the third term, again supposing t ≥ t0+1. Notice that if t is odd, then I ∼ ~w(t) means
ℓI(t) ∼ Ber
(
N◦/2+(N−N◦)θ(t)
N◦+(N−N◦)θ(t)
)
. Therefore,
1
η(t)
log
(
E
I∼~w(t)
exp
{
η(t)
(
−ℓI(t)− E
I′∼~w(t)
[−ℓI′(t)]
)})
=
1
η(t)
log
(
N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t) exp
{
η(t)
N◦/2 + (N −N◦)θ(t)
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
}
+
N◦/2 + (N −N◦)θ(t)
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t) exp
{
−η(t) N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
})
≥ 1
η(t)
log
(
N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t) exp
{
η(t)
N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
}
+
N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t) exp
{
−η(t) N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
})
=
1
η(t)
log
(
N◦
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t) cosh
{
η(t)
N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
})
.
Now, we observe that log(cosh(x)) is 1
cosh2(x1)
-strongly convex on x ∈ [0, x1]. Thus,
log(cosh(x))− log(cosh(0)) ≥ d
dy
log(cosh(y))
∣∣∣∣
y=0
+
x2
2 cosh2(x1)
,
so cosh(x) ≥ exp { x2
2 cosh2(x1)
}
on this interval. Then, notice that if t ≥ t0 + 1, η(t) ≤ c2/4. So,
θ(t) ≥ 0 gives
η(t)
N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t) ≤
η(t)
2
≤ c
2
8
.
Using this strong-convexity bound on cosh(x) along with the two inequalities θ(t) ≤ 1/N and
[2 cosh2(c2/8)]−1 ≥ (1/2) exp {−c2/4} results in
1
η(t)
log
(
N◦
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t) cosh
{
η(t)
N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
})
≥ 1
η(t)
log
(
N◦
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
)
+
η(t)
2 exp {c2/4}
(
N◦/2
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
)2
≥ 1
η(t)
log
(
N◦
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
)
+
η(t)
2 exp {c2/4}
(
N◦
2N◦ + 1
)2
≥ 1
η(t)
log
(
N◦
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
)
+
η(t)
18 exp {c2/4} .
Finally, using log(x) ≥ 1− 1/x,
1
η(t)
log
(
N◦
N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
)
≥ 1
η(t)
(
1− N◦ + (N −N◦)θ(t)
N◦
)
≥ − N
N◦
θ(t)
η(t)
.
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Thus, when t ≥ t0 + 1 and t is odd,
1
η(t)
log
(
E
I∼~w(t)
exp
{
η(t)
(
−ℓI(t)− E
I′∼~w(t)
[−ℓI′(t)]
)})
≥ − N
N◦
θ(t)
η(t)
+
η(t)
18 exp {c2/4} . (50)
Otherwise, if t is even, then I ∼ ~w(t) implies
ℓI(t) ∼ Ber
(
(N◦/2) exp {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
)
.
So, using cosh(x) ≥ 1,
1
η(t)
log
(
E
I∼~w(t)
exp
{
η(t)
(
−ℓI(t)− E
I′∼~w(t)
[−ℓI′(t)]
)})
=
1
η(t)
log
(
(N◦/2) exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t) exp
{
η(t)
(N◦/2) exp {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
}
+
(N◦/2) exp {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t) exp
{
−η(t) (N◦/2) exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
})
≥ 1
η(t)
log
(
(N◦/2) exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t) exp
{
η(t)
(N◦/2) exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
}
+
(N◦/2) exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t) exp
{
−η(t) (N◦/2) exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
})
=
1
η(t)
log
(
N◦ exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t) cosh
{
η(t)
(N◦/2) exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
})
≥ 1
η(t)
log
(
N◦ exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
)
.
Then, using log(x) ≥ 1− 1/x,
1
η(t)
log
(
N◦ exp {−η(t)/2}
N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
)
≥ 1
η(t)
(
1− N◦ cosh {η(t)/2} + (N −N◦)θ(t)
N◦ exp {−η(t)/2}
)
=
1
η(t)
(
N◦ sinh {−η(t)/2} − (N −N◦)θ(t)
N◦ exp {−η(t)/2}
)
≥ − 1
η(t)
N
N◦
θ(t) exp {−η(t)/2}
= − N
N◦
exp
{
−η(t)( t−22 )
}
η(t)
.
(51)
Combing Eqs. (50) and (51) and recognizing θ(t) ≤ exp
{
−η(t)( t−22 )
}
gives us
1
η(t)
log
(
E
I∼~w(t)
exp
{
η(t)
(
−ℓI(t)− E
I′∼~w(t)
[−ℓI′(t)]
)})
≥ − N
N◦
exp
{
−η(t)( t−22 )
}
η(t)
+
η(t)
18 exp {c2/4} I[t is odd].
(52)
56
Now, we wish to sum the two terms in Eq. (52). First, using that t−2√
t
≥ 3
√
t
2 when t ≥ 6 and t0 ≥ 5
since log(N) ≥ 5/2, as well as crudely lower bounding t0 by dividing by 2,
T∑
t=t0+1
exp
{
−η(t)( t−22 )
}
η(t)
=
T∑
t=t0+1
√
t
c
√
log(N)
exp
{
−c
√
log(N)√
t
(t− 2
2
)}
≤
T∑
t=t0+1
√
t
c
√
log(N)
exp
{
−3c
4
√
t log(N)
}
≤ 1
c
√
log(N)
∫ ∞
t0
√
t exp
{
−3c
4
√
t log(N)
}
dt
=
128
(
t0
9c2 log(N)
16 + 2
√
t0
3c
√
log(N)
4 + 2
)
exp
{
−(3c/4)√t0 log(N)}
27c4(log(N))2
≤
128
(
16 log(N)
c2
9c2 log(N)
16 + 2
4
√
log(N)
c
3c
√
log(N)
4 + 2
)
exp
{
−(3c/4)
√
8 log(N)
c
}
c4(log(N))2
≤
128
(
16 + 9log(N) +
2
(log(N))2
)
c4N2
.
(53)
Then, supposing the worst case where both t0 + 1 and T are even, and crudely upper bounding
t0 + 2 by multiplying by 3/2,
T∑
t=t0+1
η(t)I[t is odd] =
(T−1)/2∑
t=(t0+2)/2
η(2t)
=
(T−1)/2∑
t=(t0+2)/2
c
√
log(N)√
2t
≥
∫ (T−1)/2
(t0+2)/2
c
√
log(N)√
2t
dt
= c
√
log(N)[
√
T − 1−√t0 + 2]
≥ c
√
log(N)(T − 1)− c
√
log(N)
√
24 log(N)
c
= c
√
log(N)(T − 1)− 2 log(N)√6.
(54)
Thus, combining Eqs. (49), (53) and (54), we have shown that for T ≥ 16 log(N)c2 ,
RˆHedge(T ) ≥ RˆHedge(T )− RˆHedge(t0)
≥ −
√
T + 1
c
√
log(N)
[
c2/8 + log(N◦ + 1)
]
−
128
(
16 + 9log(N) +
2
(log(N))2
)
c4N◦N
+
c
√
log(N)(T − 1)
18 exp {c2/4} −
2 log(N)
√
6
18 exp {c2/4} .
57
Finally, rearranging the restriction on the size N◦ and using
√
T−1√
T+1
≥ 1/2 gives
log(N◦ + 1) <
c2 log(N)
72 exp {c2/4} −
c2
8
=⇒
1
c
√
log(N)
[
c2/8 + log(N◦ + 1)
]
<
1
2
√
T − 1√
T + 1
c
√
log(N)
18 exp {c2/4} .
Thus,
RˆHedge(T ) ≥ c
√
log(N)(T − 1)
36 exp {c2/4} −
128
(
16 + 9log(N) +
2
(log(N))2
)
c4N◦N
− 2 log(N)
√
6
18 exp {c2/4} .
H.2.2 Hedge with η(t) = c/
√
t
Now, we consider the case of playing Hedge with η(t) = c/
√
t. We define the data-generating
mechanism π such that for some even t1, at round t the loss distribution on [N ] is
µt =


δ
⊗(N◦/2)
0 ⊗ δ⊗(N−N◦/2)1 : t odd and t ≤ t1
δ
⊗(N◦/2)
1 ⊗ δ⊗(N◦/2)0 ⊗ δ⊗(N−N◦)1 : t even and t ≤ t1
δ0 ⊗ δ⊗(N−1)1 : t even and t > t1.
That is, the environment plays the same policy that they played for Hedge in Appendix H.2.1 up
to t = t1, and then afterwards all experts incur loss of 1 except the first expert.
Since t1 is even, for t > t1 we expand on Eq. (45) to obtain
Li(t) =


t1
2 : i = 1
2t−t1
2 : i ∈ [N◦] \ {1}
t : i 6∈ [N◦] .
(55)
Thus, when t > t1,
wi(t) =


[
1 + (N◦ − 1) exp{−η(t)(t− t1 − 1)} + (N −N◦) exp{−η(t)(t− t1/2− 1)}
]−1
: i = 1[
exp{−η(t)(t1 − t+ 1)}+N◦ − 1 + (N −N◦) exp{−η(t)(t1/2)}
]−1
: i ∈ [N◦] \ {1}[
exp{−η(t)(t1/2− t+ 1)}+ (N◦ − 1) exp {η(t)(t1/2)} +N −N◦
]−1
: i 6∈ [N◦]
(56)
The next thing to observe is that for t > t1,
wI∗(t)(t+ 1) =
[
1 + (N◦ − 1) exp{−η(t+ 1)(t − t1)}+ (N −N◦) exp{−η(t+ 1)(t− t1/2)}
]−1
.
(57)
Now, define
t2 =
⌈
4
(
log(N)
c
+ t1
)2⌉
.
58
Then, if t > t2, observe
√
t >
2 log(N)
c
+ 2t1 =⇒
√
t >
2 log(N◦)
c
+ 2t1 ⇐⇒
c
√
t
2
− ct1 > log(N◦) =⇒
c[t− t1]√
t+ 1
> log(N◦ − 1) ⇐⇒
(N◦ − 1) exp{−η(t+ 1)(t− t1)} < 1.
(58)
Similarly, if t > t2 then
√
t >
2 log(N)
c
+ 2t1 =⇒
√
t >
2 log(N)
c
+ t1 ⇐⇒
√
t− t1 > 2 log(N)
c
=⇒
c[t− t1/2]√
t+ 1
> log(N −N◦) ⇐⇒
(N −N◦) exp{−η(t+ 1)(t− t1/2)} < 1.
(59)
Combining Eqs. (57) to (59) shows that when t > t2, since t2 > t1 by definition we have
wI∗(t)(t+ 1) ≥ 1/3.
This observation controls the first term of Eq. (44). For the second term of Eq. (44), we note that
by Jensen’s inequality,
T∑
t=t0+1
1
η(t)
log
(
E
I∼~w(t)
exp
{
η(t)
(
−ℓI(t)− E
I′∼~w(t)
[−ℓI′(t)]
)})
≥ 0.
Define t0 =
⌊
16 log(N)
c2
⌋
. Now, when t0+1 ≤ t ≤ t1, wI∗(t)(t+1) behaves as in Eq. (47). Thus, when
t + 1 is odd, wI∗(t)(t + 1) ≤ 1/N◦ since θ(t + 1) ≥ 0. Otherwise, when t + 1 is even, we use that
since log(N) > 5/2,
exp
{
η(t+ 1)
2
}
≤ exp
{
c2
8
√
log(N)
}
≤ exp
{
c2/8
}
,
as well as θ(t+ 1) ≥ 0 and cosh(x) ≥ 1 to obtain wI∗(t)(t+ 1) ≤ exp{c
2/8}
N◦ . Thus,
t1∑
t=t0+1
(
1
η(t+ 1)
− 1
η(t)
)
log
(
1
wI∗(t)(t+ 1)
)
≥
t1∑
t=t0+1
(
1
η(t+ 1)
− 1
η(t)
) [
log(N◦)− c
2
8
]
=
log(N◦)− c2/8
c
[
√
t1 + 1−
√
t0 + 1].
(60)
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Set t1 = T/2, and suppose T >
32 log(N)
c2 to ensure t1 > t0+1. Then, plugging Eq. (60) into Eq. (44)
gives
RˆHedge(T )− RˆHedge(t0) ≥ −
√
T + 1
c
log(3) +
log(N◦)− c2/8
c
[
√
t1 + 1−
√
t0 + 1]
≥ −
√
T + 1
c
log(3) +
log(N◦)− c2/8
2c
[√
T + 1−
√
32 log(N)
c
]
≥ log(N◦)
4
√
T + 1− 3[log(N◦)− c
2/8] log(N)
c2
,
where we also used log(N◦) > c2/4 + 4 log(3).
I Implementing FTRL-CARE
The following algorithm efficiently implements FTRL-CARE. The algorithm’s validity follows from
Theorem 5.
Algorithm 1: Implementation of FTRL-CARE
Inputs:
• constants c1, c2 > 0, number of experts N ;
• a function root : (f, (a, b)) ∈ (R→ R)× R2 → maybe(R) which returns a root of the
function f on the interval [a, b] when f(a)f(b) < 0, and returns nothing otherwise.
Result: Infinite list of weight vectors, { ~̟ }t∈N
H = Function
(
~u 7→
{∑
i∈[N ][−ui log(ui)]
})
;
~w = Function
(
(η, ~ξ) 7→
{(
exp(−η~ξi)∑
i′∈[N] exp(−η~ξi′ )
)
i∈[N ]
})
;
~L(0) = zeroes(N);
~̟ (1) = ones(N)/N ;
for t ∈ N do
Receive Data: vector of expert losses from round t, ~ℓ(t) ∈ [0, 1][N ]
~L(t) = ~L(t− 1) + ~ℓ(t);
ηˆ(t+ 1) = root
(
Function
(
η 7→
{
η − 2c1
√
c2+H(~w(η,~L(t)))√
t+1
})
,
(
2c1
√
c2√
t+1
,
2c1
√
c2+log(N)√
t+1
))
;
~̟ (t+ 1) = ~w(ηˆ(t+ 1), ~L(t))
end
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